ESSAY
WHEN THE LAW DOESN'T COUNT: THE 2000 ELECTION AND
THE FAILURE OF THE RULE OF LAW
KIM LANE SCHEPPELEt
In the movie Monty Python and the Holy Grail,' the unconvincinglooking but immensely self-confident King Arthur and his rag-tag
band of knights gallop on their imaginary horses through the 'wild
forest in search of the Holy Grail. Encountering one obstacle after
another, our heroes (for they are clearly meant by the logic of
storytelling to be our heroes)2 overcome these challenges by making
the most of the distinctly unroyal conduct of quibbling, distracting the
opposition, and sometimes just running away.3 At one point in their
quest, however, the path of Arthur's little band is physically blocked by
giant human figures dressed in forbidding black armor, screaming in
chorus. Their leader introduces them as "Knights Who Say NI!" The
Knights' main weapon is to shout "NI!" (also sometimes "Peng,"

t Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Pennsylvania. Many people
proxided constructive comments on short notice while the ashes from this election still
smoldered. I am particularly grateful to Steve Burbank, Cary Coglianese, Richard
Fallon, Howard Gillman, Ed Hartnett, Seth Kreimer, Frank Michelman, Martha
Minow, Serguei Oushakine, and the Constitutional Law and Legal Theory Workshop
at the Harvard Law School for clarifying the arguments, pointing out contradictions,
and generally engaging in the ultimate act of collegiality-taking early ideas seriously
and nurturing them woith care. If I could not take on board the full implications of all
of the perceptive comments, it is certainly not the fault of the commentators.
MONMY P T'HON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python Pictures 1974).
ladimir Propp discusses the structural elements of folktales and identifies that a
folktale might start, for example, with a seeker-hero leaving home in search of
something. The seeker-hero then meets with challenges along the way that he
overcomes with the help of a magical element, and the meeting of the challenge in
this way is what allows others to recognize him as the hero that he is and allows him to
achieve the goal that he seeks. VLADIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE 3942, 60-61 (Laurence Scott trans., 2d ed. 1968).
i These are not elements of a folktale as described by Propp, and their humor
derives from the fact that they run counter to the logic of storytelling, where the
challenges are supposed to be met with feats of cleverness, bravery, and magic. Id. at

60-62.
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"Neee," and "Wom") at the unhappy group in particularly shrill
voices, causing our heroes to recoil and cover their ears. And,
following fairytale convention, the Knights will not let our heroes pass
until the heroes perform a brave feat. The brave feat the Knights have
in mind? Our heroes need to bring them something.4 And what do
the Knights demand? 'We want," they say, "a shrubbery!"
As storytelling rules dictate, our heroes go off in search of
shrubbery. And, after overcoming more obstacles designed to test
their courage and strength,6 our heroes find the prize: a rather
attractive-looking planting with a white picket fence all around.
Pleased with themselves, they deposit the shrubbery before the
Knights, who are somehow still dissatisfied. The reason for their
dissatisfaction? The Knights Who Formerly Said NI! are now "the
Knights Who Say Neeeow.. . wum... ping!," and they now claim that
"we are no longer contractually bound by any agreements previously
entered into by the Knights Who Say NI!" What do the Renamed
Knights now
want? "You must get us [pregnant pause] another
7
shrubbery!"
The movie-going audience, together with Arthur and his Knights,
realize at this point that they are in an endless loop. The Knights
Who Say NI! (or Neeow... wum... ping!, as the case may be) will
never be satisfied; their demands are endless and they will always want
something that our heroes haven't done. This violates fairytale
conventions, which require that our heroes be tested, that they prove
their merit, and, when they have met the challenge, that they be then,
by right, allowed to pass. But the Knights Who Say NI! don't seem to
know the formula. They are caught outside the standard story line in
an endless loop of their own. From the sidelines, we can shout,
"They've done what you asked-now let them pass!" But the Knights
Who Say NI! scream the magic words that are designed to disable
their hapless victims so loudly that they drown out everything else.
From the moment that Election 2000 failed to produce a clear
4 One of the feats that a hero can be asked to perform is to fill
an especially
difficult request, one of which can be a task of "supply" or "manufacture." Id. at 61.
MON Y PVrHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL, supra note 1.
Or at least that is how the story is supposed to go. In the movie, our heroes go
off and attempt to torture an old woman to disclose where they might find
shrubberies, until they are stopped in their efforts by an enterprising young shrubber,
who comes along and offers to sell them some. Id. Propp suggests that the
performance of the feat is supposed to be achieved by magical agents, one of which is
that People can appear out of nowhere to help the hero. PROPP, supra note 2, at 45.

MONTYPYrHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL, supra note 1.
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result on election day, Al Gore and his modem-day knights set off on
a journey through Florida's legal forest, encountering one obstacle
after another in their effort to "count every vote."8
Fairytale
convention dictated that, after proving his courage and his strength by

acquiring the various court permissions he won along the way in the
state of Florida, Gore should be allowed to recount the ballots to see
if, in fact, he had won." This is one reason why it seemed particularly
unfair when the U.S. Supreme Court suddenly stopped first the count
and then the election, announcing an ambitious set of criteria for
recounting that would have required much "additional work" to
specify'-and yet the Supreme Court's own timing gave Gore no
opportunity to meet the new standards. The decision left supporters
of both Al Gore and George W. Bush with a sense that the drama
didn't have a proper conclusion." After the immense tension of the
thirty-six days when the election hung in the balance, the whole votecounting contest was simply called off by a Supreme Court decision.
The election ended with the spectacle of a group of television
reporters and legal commentators frantically trying to read and

"After a campaign that even some supporters said lacked a coherent message, he
not only found one but has stuck to it:Count every vote." Katharine Q. Seelye &
Melinda Henneberger, Contesting the Vote: The Gore Camp; In Storm's Eye, Gore Stays
Ub'at, Aides Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2000, § 1, at 1.
" Bush supporters might counter with a fairytale version of their
own that would
have a similarly irresistible logic. George IV. Bush (the hero in this version) is
venturing through the wild forest with his supporters, having already found the Holy
Grail-the victorious election result. But then a pursuer (Al Gore) makes his
appearance and this pursuer chases our hero in an effort to steal the Grail. If our hero
really is a hero, then he should be rescued from pursuit through magical means.
PROPP, supra note 2, at 56-57. Our hero may throw things in the way of his pursuer,
and ifour hero is truly a hero, these random things will spring up into fearsome
obstacles (rexersals, stays), id. at 57, or, alternatively, our hero may be given a new
appearance that allows him to triumph with the magical assistance of a helper (James
Baker, Dick Cheney, the Supreme Court), id. at 62.
p, Bush v.Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 532-33 (2000) (per curiam). The U.S. Supreme
Court required that statewide standards be adopted "after opportunity for argument"
along with "practical procedures to implement them." Id.
J1For elaboration, see infra Part IV where I argue that we still don't know by now
how many votes Bush won Florida, nor can we confidently say what Florida election
law, as it was applied in the 2000 election, is. Continuing the analogy, the ending of
AlontY P')tlon and the Holy Grai4 which is devoted largely to challenging all of these
storytelling conventions, is actually rather similar. At the end of the film, the (modern
day) British police ride up to where the strangely dressed actors are charging over a
hill and arrest them all for breach of the peace. The drama that was all along set in
the Middle Ages suddenly turns out to be a crime story in modern Britain. The film
ends abruptly as King Arthur and his knights are taken into custody. MONTY PV'IHON
AND THE HOLY GRAIL, supra note 1.
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summarize on-air a sixty-page set of decisions that did not have a clear
result. The case was reversed and remanded back to the Florida
Supreme Court for proceedings consistent with the opinion 2 -but
there were no further procedures that could have been consistent with
the opinion except a Florida Supreme Court judgment saying that
nothing could be done. The best reporters and legal commentators
could do immediately was to say that they thought Gore might have
conclusively lost but that they would wait for Gore to announce what
he thought the decision meant. Gore conceded the next day. The
Florida Supreme Court, whose critical decision the U.S. Supreme
Court found wanting, conceded the day after that."
From childhood tales, we know how these stories are supposed to
turn out. In one of the two usual scenarios, the hero is supposed to be
killed off as he performs the feats he has been asked to accomplish. If
he is cut down as he tries to meet the challenges he has been given, he
is exposed as a false hero. 14 Altematively, in the other scenario, if the
hero satisfies the requirements laid down, then he must be allowed to
pass, since he is the true hero after all.'5 It is not supposed to happen
that the hero satisfies the requirements only to find that he has to go
back and start all over again 6 with a new set of rules. (And even if
there are new rules, they are not supposed to be announced when
there is no longer time to play the game under them.) Once the
Grail-seekers have found the shrubbery as they were originally asked
to do, they should not have to go off to hunt for more bushes that

12

Bush v. Gore, 121 S. CL at 533.

13 "On the date of the subject election, the Florida Election Code did not provide

the elements necessary for a resolution of the disputed issues, based on the

constitutional parameters expressed by the United States Supreme Court.
Accordingly, relief cannot be granted, and this case is dismissed." Gore v. Harris, No.
00-2431, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Dec. 14, 2000) (order on remand), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/00-2431USSCRemandOrd.pdf. Some of the judges
amplified their anguish in a set of decisions released on December 22. See Gore v.
Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000). Justice Leander Shaw's concurring opinion
captured the fairytale logic of the election cases: "Admittedly, the present scenario is

surreal: All the king's horses and all the king's men could not get a few thousand
ballots counted. The explanation, however, is timeless. We are a nation of men and
women and, although we aspire to lofty principles, our methods at times are
imperfect." Id. at 529-30 (ShawJ, concurring).
14 Someone can be exposed as a false hero when he fails to complete a task that
has been set for him. PROPP, supranote 2, at 62.
1"The hero is ... recognized by his accomplishment of a difficult task" and then,
when he is properly recognized as the hero that he is, "the hero is married and ascends
to the throne." Id. at 62-63.
16 Sisyphus notwithstanding. Thanks to Steve Burbank
for reminding me.
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weren't on the list in the first place, especially when the order
announcing new requirements comes from the same people who gave
the initial instructions and who now claim that they are no longer
bound by the standards that they first announced. Or, in the case of
the election, once the ground rules are set so that the candidate who
gets the most votes wins, the contest shouldn't shift to guessing what
magic formula would allow the votes to be counted.
That's fairytale logic. But it is also the logic of the rule of law.
Legal requirements should not keep shifting as a quest for justice goes
on. Of course, in any moderately complex legal system, judgments by
lower courts sometimes change when an appeal results in conflicting
interpretations of law (or in reversals and remands) because the rule
of law typically guarantees a certain course of reexamination to check
the results an initial court reaches. Each of these shifts can ultimately
result in a change in who concretely wins at different stages of the
process, but such changes should also result in a clarification of what
the law required at the time that the contested actions were
performed. Ideally, also, the winner at the last stage should be the
one that had the best of the principles everyone knew were in play all
along. The process of successive legal judgments in the same case
should not keep shifting the ground out from under the litigants so
that, in the end, the case is decided by rules that did not seem to be in
existence when the case was begun or that had been discarded along
the way as irrelevant only to be picked up as decisive later on. Law
shouldn't be a game of "gotcha."
Regardless of one's political views on which party had the better
policy positions in the election and the better legal arguments in the
subsequent court cases, both the Bush and Gore sides were disserved
by the public spectacle of a court system that could not fix a stable set
of principles that got clearer as appeals went on. Gore, in particular,
found himself in a succession of "Catch 22s," in which the next logical
legal step required completion of some subsequent step that he could
not attempt until he had already taken the next logical step. 17 In the
end, the Catch 22 dilemmas proved fatal for Gore because, when
confronted with an impossible next step, the status quo at the point of
impossibility always wins. And George W. Bush's most powerful
resource during the thirty-six-day rollercoaster ride was that he had
the status quo going for him. The legitimacy of Election 2000,
however, is clouded because it is hard to describe the process that

17

SeeJOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22 (1961).
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occurred as one that deeply respected legality though it was decided
by America's highest court, which in the end pulled a constitutional
rabbit out of the election-litigation hat. The various decisions issued
by multiple courts and handed down with great speed in November
and December 2000, taken together, do not reveal a process befitting
a government committed to the rule of law. In the end, as Justice
Stevens, dissenting from the Supreme Court opinion that ended the
recounts, argued:
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial
system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day
heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today's
decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the
Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of

law.' 8
At the start of the twenty-first century, America has portrayed itself
as a state that makes a commitment to the rule of law something it
claims for itself and also demands of other states. Unlike some other
constitutions,'9 however, the U.S. Constitution does not have an
explicit rule-of-law clause. " ' The United States therefore has no
explicit rule-of-law jurisprudence in the sense that has become typical
in a number of other constitutional democracies. One lesson of
modern history, however, is that the basic requirements of the rule of
law are not optional in a constitutional state. Germans learned this
lesson especially well, having had their apparently "model" Weimar
Constitution collapse in the most horrific unconstitutionality of our
time. The rise of Hitler through what seemed to be perfectly legal
methods is now widely regarded as having cast a long shadow over the
"calamitous positivism" of Weimarjurisprudence.n The German Basic
18Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 539 (2000) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
'q See infra note 24 (listing constitutions with specific rule-of-law clauses).
20 The American Constitution has some rough equivalents-for example the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against ex post
facto laws in Article I, Section 9. But to the extent that the Due Process Clause covers
some of the same territory as the principles I am talking about here, it does so
primarily in the area of criminal law.
21 See generally ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE:
CARL SCHMrIT IN
WEIMAR (forthcoming 2002).
22As David Currie writes, references to Recht in German law have been seen
by

some constitutional scholars as a reaction against "calamitous positivism," binding
judges in cases of conflict between the literal wording of the statutes and their senses
of justice to "follow justice rather than law." DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF
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Law that rose from the ashes of the victims of Nazi Germany, not
surprisingly, now explicitly embodies the idea of a Rechtsstaat (often
translated, though imperfectly, as the rule of law).23 Other countries
that have been through historical horrors of their own have included
rule-of-law clauses in their constitutions as well. 21 In short, rule-of-law
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 119 (1984).

See Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde, The Origin and Development of the Concept of the
Rechtsstaat, in STATE, SOCIETY AND LIBERTY STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 47 (J.A. Undenood trans., 1991). Article 20 (entitled "Basic
principles of state order, right to resist") of the Basic Law of the German Federal
Republic is also helpful:
(I) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It is being exercised by the
people through elections and voting and by specific organs of the legislature,
the executive power, and thejudiciary.
(3) Legislation is subject to the constitutional order, the executive and the
judiciary are bound by law and justice.
(4) All Germans have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this
constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20 (F.R.G.), available at http://wwv.uniuerzburg.de/law/gmOOOOO_.html.
The central importance of this Article can be seen in the fact that it is
constitutionally unamendable. Id. art. 79(3). For discussion of the Rechtsstaat
principle, see CURRIE, supra note 22, at 18-20; DONALD KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 36-37 (2d

ed. 1997).
t Article 2(l) of the postcommunist Hungarian Constitution states:
The Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic constitutional state.
Jogall4n,a direct translation into Hungarian of Rechtsstaat, is translated here
as "constitutional state."]
A NJAGYAR K6ZTARSASAG ALKOTMiNYA art. 2(1) (Hung.), available at http://wv.uniwauerzburg.de/law/hu00000_.html.
Article I of the postsoviet Russian Constitution states:
The Russian Federation-Russia shall be a democratic federal rule-of-law state
ith the republican form of government.
KONST. RF 1993 art. 1 (Russ.), available at http://wv.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/
rs00000_.html.
The post-apartheid Constitution of South Africa, in Chapter 1, Section 1 (entitled
"Founding Provisions") declares:
The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on
the following values:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of
human rights and freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections
and a multi-part), system of democratic government, to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness.
S. AFR. CONST., ch. 1, § 1 (S.Mr.), available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/
sfl0000.html.
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clauses in modem constitutions are far from unusual, and there is a

developing sense of basic judicially recognizable principles of a ruleof-law state that are fundamental to a constitutional order, a set of
principles of surprising resilience across constitutional systems.
What I will suggest in this Essay is that Americans can learn
something from looking abroad at times like this-not just to see
narrowly whether other countries use paper ballots or some more
modem technology in their elections, but instead to see what basic
principles of state are crucial for creating a constitutional democracy
that operates under the rule of law. And, toward this end, it is helpful
to see how others have self-consciously defined what it means to have
a rule-of-law state. Election 2000 reveals that Americans have not

The postcommunist Constitution of Slovenia provides in Article 2 (entitled "Rule
of Law, Social State"):
Slovenia is a state governed by the rule of law and is a social state.
USTAVA art. 2 (Slovn.), available at http://-wv.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/si00000_.html.
The Constitution of Switzerland (enacted in 1998 when Switzerland was having a
major national debate over its role in the Holocaust) provides in Article 5 (entitled
"Rule of Law"):
(1) The law is the basis and limitation for all activities of the state.
(2) State activity must be in the public interest and proportional.
(3) State institutions and private persons must act in good faith.
(4) The Confederation and the Cantons do respect international law.
BUNDESVERFASSUNG

art. 5 (Switz.), available at http://Avw.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/

szOOOOO_.html.
The post-Franco Constitution of Spain states in Article 9 (entitled "Rule of Law"):
(1) The citizens and public powers are subject to the Constitution and the
legal order.
(2) It is the responsibility of the public powers to promote conditions so that
liberty and equality of the individual and the groups he joins will be real and
effective; to remove those obstacles which impede or make difficult their full
implementation, and to facilitate participation of all citizens in the political,
economic, cultural, and social life.
(3) The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the normative
order, the publication of the norms, the non-retroactivity of punitive
provisions which are not favorable to, or which restrict individual rights, legal
security, and the interdiction of arbitrariness of public powers.
CONSTITUCION art. 9 (Spain), available at http://vvw.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/
sp0000.html.
The postcommunist Constitution of Romania in Article 15 (entitled "Rule of Law,
No Retroactive Law") provides:
(1) All citizens enjoy the rights and freedoms granted to them by the
Constitution and other laws, and have the duties laid down thereby.
(2) The law acts only for the future, with the exception of the more favorable
penal law.
CONSTITUTIA art. 15 (Rom.), available at http://vw.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/
ro00000 .html.
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incorporated into constitutional jurisprudence principles that have
been widely accepted elsewhere.
The rule of law in American jurisprudence is customarily
associated, as Richard Fallon has pointed out, with historicist,
formalist, or process-based ideas about law.i While these "strands" of
thought each have their distinctive elements, all start from preference
for and deference to positive law, particularly statutes, and in fact they
can be seen as interpretive principles for understanding positive law.
Should a statute be read in its historical context? Or according to its
plain words? Or in light of what present procedures require? The
rule of law is about stabilizing meanings of positive law, wherever
possible. This is perhaps one reason why the rule of law is often used
in a merely decorative manner in American constitutional
jurisprudence-precisely because it doesn't say more about what
substantive goals one ought to try to achieve through law.
Courts outside the United States, however, have had to develop an
explicitly substantive doctrine of the rule of law to animate rule-of-law
clauses in their constitutions. Comparative analysis reveals that ruleof-law clauses are not used primarily to decide among principles of
interpretation, but instead to diagnose when a statute has gone badly
'rong and needs to be supplemented by principles taken from
elsewhere in the law. The rule of law, then, emerges in comparative
constitutional jurisprudence not as an interpretive tool, but as a

diagnostic one. As such, it appears, perhaps surprisingly, exactly at
the moment when a court is about to declare that a statute is
-

Fallon identifies four strands in American constitutional jurisprudence on the
rule of law: (1) historicist understandings that preserve the stability of the law through
a steady reliance on original intent; (2) formalist understandings that emphasize the
i.ay in which formal rules facilitate advance planning through fairly wrning subjects of
the law and of what is required of them; (3) legal process understandings that
empha-size procedural fairness and public reason in the particular case; and (4)
substantive understandings in which the moral intelligibility of the law is ensured
Fallon emphasizes the tensions among and
thro ugh rule-of-law norms.
incompatibilities in these various strands, and provides ample empirical evidence from
an extensihe survey of American constitutional case law to show that all are in wide use.
In his sketches toward a general theory of the rule of law, Fallon emphasizes that a
substantive conception of the rule of law would be harder (and more unwise) to
integrate into a general theory. Historical, formal, and procedural understandings are
more constructively used for the basis of such a theory, in his view. I hope to show that
the conception of the rule of law that one can find from looking outside the American
context is closer to Fallon's substantive strand and that it is possible to develop a
substantive conception of the rule of law that could add to Fallon's model. Richard H.
FallonJr., "The,Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,97 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1997).
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unconstitutional. Rule of law becomes the device through which a
court justifies its need to look elsewhere in the law for guidance about
what to do.
In analyzing Election 2000, I will argue that the problems we saw
in Florida stemmed from a deeply flawed statute on which different
courts along the way tried to put pressure. What resulted was a great
deal of legal flip-flopping from one decision to the next since the
different courts that heard the various election challenges could not
agree on how to fill in the blanks or remove the contradictions from
the law, something that courts in countries with explicit rule-of-law
clauses in their constitutions do by developing strong substantive
conceptions of what those clauses mean. The end result in the
American election was that it was, I argue, decided according to no
discernible law at all.
I.

THE RULE OF LAW AS A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE"

There is a good historical reason why the United States doesn't
have a rule-of-law clause in its Constitution. Rule-of-law clauses didn't
become standard equipment in constitutional design until the postWorld War II period, when the world had seen the horrors of
constitutional regimes run amok. For the previous generations of
constitution-writers, and certainly in the late eighteenth century when
the U.S. Constitution was written, separation of powers and lists of
rights were the mechanisms of choice for reducing the chances that
the institutions of state would amass powers for use against the state's
own citizens. There was a great faith that representative institutions of
republican government, embedded in a system of separation of
26 In what follows, I am going to commit the unforgivable comparative
law sin of
assuming that the English "rule of law," the German Rechtsstaat, the Hungarian
jogdllam, and other similar nationally specific legal ideas with their own distinctive
differences can be discussed more or less interchangeably.
Let me give a
Wittgensteinian defense. If words are as words do, then I think that the clear historic
and national differences among these various terms have been deeply eroded by the
modem jurisprudence of different constitutional courts.
The rule-of-law (or
equivalent) clauses of contemporary constitutions, despite their diverse treatments in
national histories of legal philosophy, are invoked in remarkably similar cases. My
guess is that constitutional courtjudges are far more likely at this point to borrow from
transnational constitutional experience than from their own national histories, and
this is what gives the constitutional jurisprudence across national boundaries such
coherence. The new rule-of-law jurisprudence has far fewer distinctive national
qualities than the intellectual histories of their various national concepts would
indicate. But this is an empirical claim, subject to examination by review of the
decisions.
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powers in which different constituencies and different majorities
would ensure that no unchecked body could run roughshod over the
rest, would have no opportunity or warrant for engaging in violations
of citizens' legally protected interests on a substantial scale. Judicially
enforceable guarantees of rights could correct individual-level abuses
or temporary excesses.
Obviously, however, the constitutions that embodied ideas about
separation of powers and respect for rights were not enough to
prevent the descent of apparently constitutional states into "regimes
of horror" in the twentieth century. "7 The regimes responsible for
some of the most horrific twentieth-century abuses of human rights
were regimes that started with written constitutions embodying just
these features (or at least constitutions that had moved in that
But these
direction from previously more absolutist regimes).
constitutions failed nonetheless to prevent their governments from
Nazism famously grew out of the
committing mass atrocities.
weaknesses in the Weimar Constitution, ' and Austrian fascism grew in
the same soil that had nurtured the first European constitution to
institutionalize a strong form of judicial review. The Russian
', So, Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Interpretation After Regimes of Horror
(Mas 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
paper.tafabstiactid=236219. In that paper, I use Julia Kristeva's conception of horror
and its associated process of abjection, see generally JULIA KRISTEVA, POwERS OF
HORROR: A;N EssAY ON ABJECTION (Leon S. Roudiez trans., Columbia Univ. Press
1982) (1980), to mack those regimes that have carried on such comprehensive abuse
against their own citizenries that, in constructing a new regime, those who lived
through the old one can only look back on the bad old days with the particular
o imbination of familiarity and disgust, recognition and rejection, that defines horror.
-, The intellectual debates that surrounded the collapse of the Weimar
G'institution flirted with the idea that law should be nothing more than a tool for the
exercise of power, a view famously attributed to Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, "the
energing Nazi legal order was superior to its liberal democratic rivals in part because
fascist Germany's heavy reliance on ,ague, open-ended indeterminate legal provisos
alone allegedly gate full expression to the centrality of an arbitrary willfulness that was
thought to constitute the unavoidable essence of all legal experience." William E.
Scheuerman, Intrduction to THE RULE OF LAw UNDER SIEGE 3 (William E. Scheuerman
td., 19911). Others who argued against Schmitt nonetheless at first took skeptical views
of law and its ability to do anything other than provide post hoc rationalizations for
dccisions reached on other grounds. Law, when confronted with state sovereignty and
the power it represented, had no defense, as Franz Neumann argued. See FRxNZ
NI-1U\IANN, THE RULE OF LAw: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN MODERN

So( IM 4 (1986) ("So far as the sovereignty of the state extends there is no place for
the Rule of Law."). But the experience of fascism brought at least some of the early
Frankfurt school back from the legal ab)ss after the war. See Scheuerman, supra, at 2
(contrasting Neumann and Kirchheimer's "appreciation for a series of liberal legal
and political institutions" with their colleagues' "apocalyptic theorizing").
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Revolution swept aside the tentative moves toward parliamentary
government expressed in the 1906 Russian Constitution and Japanese
aggressions in Asia were carried out under the Meiji Constitution that,
while far more absolutist than its Western European counterparts, also
institutionalized a bicameral parliament with more than cosmetic
powers. Contemplating the human devastation wrought by fascism,
Stalinism, and the aggressions leading to the Second World War,
constitutional drafters after the war tried to find new constitutional
mechanisms beyond separation of powers and lists of rights to bolster
the ability of "post-horror" states to say "never again."
Post-War, post-horror constitutions as a result typically include
guarantees of a particular form of accountable government,!" longer
lists of rights (some of them constitutionally unamendable), ' ' the
entrenchment of powerful judicial review in an independent
institution located outside the normal judiciary,3 ' and, often, rule-oflaw clauses. 32 In postsoviet Europe and in post-apartheid South Africa,
these mechanisms have been further institutionalized to the point
where they are now the standard operating equipment of the new
constitutionalism. While much has been written about rights and
judicial review in the new constitutions, I want here to explore briefly
what has become of these new rule-of-law clauses, both because I
believe that they tell us something important about what
constitutionalism had lacked before and also because the growing
consensus over the new meaning of the rule of law helps us to
understand what went disastrously wrong in the American election of
2000.
There is a strand of jurisprudential discussion that turns up
29

For example, the German Basic Law pronounces in Article 20(1), "The Federal

Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state." GG art. 20(1). The
postsoviet Hungarian constitution in Article 2(1) provides, "The Republic of Hungary
is an independent democratic, constitutional state." A MAGYAR K(ZTiRSASAG
ALKOTMANYA art. 2 (1).
30Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law makes certain rights unamendable

features of the German constitutional order. GG art. 79(3). Other constitutional
governments institutionalize this principle in different ways, for example, through the
requirement that statutes infringing on rights in any way be passed as "constitutional
laws" with supermajorities.
31

HEPMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUsTICE IN POST-

COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000) (pointing out that all of the postcommunist states
adopted constitutional courts).
2 See supra note 24 (citing examples). Japan is, of course, an exception
to much
of this given the influence of Americans in the constitutional drafting process and the

consequent prominence of American ideas in the design of Japan's post-War
institutions.
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fi-equently in English-language discussions of the rule of law,
particularly in the positivism versus natural law debates that were
carried on in the pages of the Harvard Law Review between H.L.A.
Hart and Lon Fuller and the subsequent elaboration of these ideas in
the crucial books they wr-ote. 33 Of course, these debates occurred in

the shadow of fascism and its association with positivism, and one of
H.L.A. Hart's major contributions to jurisprudence can be seen in his
effort to democratize and re-moralize positivism to the point where it
was possible for positivism to become intellectually respectable again.
Still, seen from the vantage point of early twenty-first-century
constitutionalism, it is Fuller's discussion of the inner morality of law
that has better captured what has happened to the practical operation
of the rule of law as courts have understood it when they have
interpreted their new rule-of-law clauses.
Fuller identified this inner morality of law with a series of
principles, the violation of which would cause a legal order to fail the
morality (and hence the legality) test. Such violations included
failures to notify the affected party of the rules she is to follow, abuses
of retroactive legislation which cannot guide action in advance, rules
that require conduct that the party cannot perform, and frequent
changes in law. These were moral principles and not just technical
requirements because they were, in modem parlance, subjectifications
of the law. They represented not just formal mandates to the
lawmaker but (to use the language available to Fuller at the time) also
criteria that must be met in order for the subjects of law to have fidelity
toward law. The inner morality of law was "inner" in two senses: it was
inner in the sense of being the deep go-without-saying animating
principle of a legal order (where "inner" is the opposite of
"superficial" or "obvious"), and it was inner in the sense of being a
mental state with which legal subjects approach the law (where
"inner" is the opposite of "externally generated" or "externally

Compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L.
REV,593 (1958) (describing and critiquing distinctions between law as it "is" and law as

it "ought" to be), with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 -xRv. L. REv. 630, 631 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law] (rejecting positivist thinking on the grounds that its "intellectual clarity is
specious and that its effects are, or may be, harmful"). See generally H.LA. HLART, THE
CONCEPT OF LxW (1961) (specifying a positivist theory of law); LON L. FULLER, THE
MOF-XLIIA'OF LAW 3 (1964) [hereinafter FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW] (explaining
that only after a clear definition of "morality" has been established can we hope to
understand the ways in which law and morality interact).
!. FULLER, THE MORALny OF LW, supra note
33, at 38-39.
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imposed"). And, as I will argue, the rule of law has become, in
comparative constitutional jurisprudence, the constitutional device
through which both of Fuller's intuitions have become incorporated
into the daily decisions of constitutional courts. The rule of law
captures both this internal logic of law and also the incorporation into
the legal order of the legitimate expectations of the legal subject.'
At one level, rule-of-law clauses seem redundant in a modem
constitution. The successful creation of a constitutional order owes at
least something to the acceptance of the rule of law as a valid
principle of state and so the existence of a functioning constitution all
by itself should bear witness to the reality of the rule of law. ' The
constitutionalization of politics brings formerly unchecked power
under law and so expands the jurisdiction within which legal
constraint operates. A constitutional state, then, seems necessarily a
state under the rule of law. Moreover, a constitutional state might be
seen as an improvement on "mere" rule of law. Rule of law as a
historical-legal principle had, as we have seen, a tendency to fall into
formalism and value-insensitive positivism, without more substantive
principles operating alongside it.
The rule-of-law jurisprudence of the new constitutional courts
indicates that the basic principles of a constitutional government do
not exhaust the ideas that might be read into the rule of law. One
might have expected this if "mere" rule-of-law principles were
superceded by a grander ambition to constitutionalize government so
5 On the private Iav side, the work of Austrian Friedrich Hayek has been
enormously influential in a libertarian defense of the rule of law. He argues that the
spontaneous order of the market required a stable framework of law within which
individuals can predictably arrange their affairs. For Hayek, law could perform this
function only when it was abstract and general, known, certain, and prospectie with
equal application to all who would call upon it. F.A. HA,EK, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 296 (1960). Hayek's view of the rule of law is what I will call an objectiist or
externalist view-one that sees laws as existing outside the legal subject, toward which
the legal subject must orient her actions as an external constraint. Fuller's view isquite
different, for he sees the morality of law as something that legal subjects bring to law as
a regularized set of expectations which a legal system should meet. Law can therefore
be constrained by something external to it-the convergence of expectations of legal
subjects.
36 There is, however, a tradition in writing about the rule of law, in which the
rule
of law is identified with the rigid adherence to statutes, so that constitutionalism then
poses a challenge to the rule of lav or can be seen only as a supplement to the rule of
law that is different in kind from ordinary rule-boundedness. As Andris Saj6 notes,
"Constitutionalism can partly diminish the rule of law's one-sided inflexibility and its
alienation from life, because it uses not only the legal means of restricting power and it
carries substantive values .... ." ANDRAS SAJ6, LIMITING GOvERNMEN T:
AN
INTRODUGrION TO CONSTITTIONALISM 208 (1999).
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that a constitutional state obviously incorporates the basic principles
of the rule of law. In fact, however, rule-of-law clauses are quite often
called upon now to do real constitutional heavy lifting above and
beyond the simple idea that a constitutional government is a
government of laws.
Clearly, maintaining both a functioning
constitution and institutionalized judicial review does not fix all of the
problems of legality that the rule of law identifies, or else one would
expect that rule-of-law clauses would be far more ornamental than
they are. But rule-of-law clauses have found a wide variety of serious
uses. Most interesting for our purposes, the core uses of rule-of-law
clauses are also deeply consistent across constitutional governments.
The main idea at stake in much contemporary comparative ruleof-law jurisprudence is the principle that law itself cannot be used as a
tool of abuse against those subject to the law. This is not the same as
the proposition that government must operate through law or that the
institutions of state must be constrained by law, both of which are
already included in the ordering principles of a constitutional state.
The rule of law's new form-that it checks whether law itself is being
used to cause harm-suggests that it is a principle responding to a
different set of problems and a different history.
How can law itself cause harm? Law itself can cause harm when its
contradictory instructions to the legal subject make it impossible for
the legal subject to orient her actions toward the law. Law itself can
cause harm when it changes so rapidly that the legal subject is thrown
off guard and therefore must be continually wary of being caught up
in legal changes that she would have no way of knowing. Law itself
can cause harm when a legal provision is interpreted one way on one
day and a contradictory way on the next so that the legal subject
cannot readily work out which interpretation will apply to her. Law
itself can cause harm when the pervasiveness of legal rules traps the
legal subject in overregulation, such that she is forced to choose
between obeying law #1 or obeying law #2 since both cannot be
simultaneously followed. Law itself can cause harm when it is
retroactively applied (and yet the legal subject is held responsible for
actions committed when the law was not in place) or is impossible to
follow (and yet the legal subject is punished for not following it). In
short, law itself can cause harm when law is the device through which
legal subjects are thrown off balance, caught in a state of uncertainty
about what their responsibilities are, and then held accountable in a
system made public to legal subjects in the moment that they are held
responsible under it.
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The new rule of law in constitutional regimes that have seen
altogether too much of this sort of legal abuse steps in to protect legal
subjects from the harsh abuses of legality that disregards legitimacy.
The new rule of law takes the legal security of the legal subject to be a
primary aim of a constitutional order. The new rule of law, therefore,
takes the point of view of the legal subject and asks what effect the law
has on her, what legal surprises she can reasonably be expected to
bear, and what legitimate expectations the legal subject has to use in
her own defense against the abusive operation of law itself. The new
rule of law does not just issue commands to legal subjects, but
considers the effects of such commands on the production of legal
subjectivity.
Do contradictory, retroactive, rapidly changing,
inconsistent, gap-filled, abusively interpreted laws help to create a
constitutional consciousness that is consistent with respect for the
legal order? Or does law like that operate by fear and coercion alone
to extract compliance from legal subjects? The new rule of law guides
the operation of law itself toward the first and eschews the second in
the full recognition that a constitutional regime can only be secure
and complete if the legal subjects of that regime are motivated to
comply with the law by more than fear of punishment when they
violate it. A constitutional regime needs to do more than subject
power to law; it needs also to encourage and respect a constitutional
consciousness in the subjects of the law.
This is not always what the rule of law has meant. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the dominant political dilemma
that constitutions sought to correct was the problem that the king was
subject to no law at all. "Rule of law" under those circumstances was
primarily an argument that the king and institutions of state had
themselves to be bound by the law that they made for others. The
fundamental equality before the law of all citizens (including those in
positions of state power) was the rule-of-law battle fought when it was
still not taken for granted that those who made the law could also be
held to be subject to it.
In contemporary constitutional regimes, that idea is taken for
granted in principle if not always in practice. Innovations in rule-oflaw thinking have moved on, pulled by new, or newly extreme, forms
of state abuse. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
new constitutional regimes have had to struggle with the fact that they
inherited a legal legacy in which the state used the law itself to control
and harass the population, not just incidentally as a tactic of
governance but as a crucial element of state policy toward its own
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citizens. 7 Fascism and state socialism, for example, embraced law as
the device that would allow citizens to be sorted, manipulated, and
ultimately controlled.- The extraordinary positivism of both forms of
regime allowed either morally despicable or multiple contradictory
laws to be passed, and those who became subject to these laws were
met with much formal legal procedure, much of it designed to
remove any humanity from the individual caught in the law's claws.
What the twentieth century revealed in more extreme ways was that
the repertoire of state abuse includes not just arbitrary and legally
groundless actions (the worry of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
constitution writers) but also the insistence on impossibly elaborate
legal precision and the arbitrary filling of legal gaps. When courts
played "gotcha" with the law, citizens could be manipulated,
subjugated, and thrown off guard without defense because they were
subject to impossibly contradictory and immensely tangled legal
regulation. With such a track record for law, law could hardly be
associated with justice. So the idea of the rule of law needed to be
adjusted to allow for the permissible escape from abusive law as well as
for the more usual legal constraint by legitimate law. In short, the
rule of law as a principle of the new constitutionalism has started to
recognize that legality alone does not entail legitimacy and that the
faithful operation of law itself is no excuse for abuses that occur in
law's name.
!7 Not that this is a historically new phenomenon.
E.P. Thompson's thoughtful
exploration of the rule of law in England under the Black Acts shows that a huge
number of newly created capital offenses were created precisely as class crimes, meant
to apply to some but not all of the population. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND

HUN-ERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLAcK AcT 190-218 (1975) (describing the politics of

the Black Act and tracing its evolution from an emergency Act to one aimed
specifically at those people who were suffering economic and social oppression). The
specific list of new crimes offended a conception of the rule of law in which the law
should be applied equally to all, not just in letter but in spirit. But, as Thompson
found, much to his own surprise, the rule of law still existed in the sense of
guaranteeing a certain stability and predictability of court challenges that made it
possible for those targeted by the law to defend themselves in ways that they would
othernvise not haxe been able to do. In his moving tribute to the rule of law at the end
of his book, this Marxist historian describes the rule of law as "an unqualified human
good." Id. at 266. The sense of the rule of law that he discovered-providing not just
for formal equality of legal provisions but providing primarily structures that are stable
enough for people to understand how the),may defend themselves-is similar in spirit
to what I will be dexeloping here.
One could, of course, say the same about South Africa during the
days of
apartheid, since the creation and maintenance of the racialist regime was done exactly
through the passage of and enforcement of statutes. Apartheid was a deeply legal
structure and not a lawless one.
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Understandingthe Rechtsstaat

The German case is perhaps the most visible and influential one
in which law was a tool of abuse and now, therefore, has to meet
higher standards ofjustification. Much has been made of the fact that
Hitler operated, at least at first, with much attention to the formal
legality of his actions,3 9 and that there was a sort of legal precision
about ensuring that the laws corresponded with state action, if not
beforehand then at least after the fact. 4° One standard view about the
rise of German fascism is that German lawyers and judges were too
positivist and formalist in their legal philosophies to resist the
onslaught of fascism that started through constitutional means. 4' As
B~ckenf~rde notes, the substantive idea of the Rechtsstaat had been
hollowed out by positivism for decades before the collapse of a
constitutional sensibility, leaving the German constitutional system
with no defense.42
Even after this history of law abuse, however, the German Basic
Law of 1949 nonetheless reintroduced the concept of the Rechtsstaat,
as a way of ensuring that a moral force be given to basic principles of
legality. What else could they do? After all, the remedy for a state that
has abused law is not to have no law when the state is reconstituted in
more democratic and responsive form. But the drafters of the
German Basic Law surely did not want to reproduce the formalism of
prior conceptions of the rule-of-law state.43
The German
Constitutional Court has made the Rechtsstaat one of the basic
foundational principles of German constitutional jurisprudence, and
39In 1930, Hitler said:
The National Socialist movement will try to achieve its aim with constitutional
means in this state. The constitution prescribes only the methods, not the
aim. In this constitutional way we shall try to gain decisive majorities in the
legislative bodies so that the moment we succeed we can give the state the
form that corresponds to our ideas.
DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITr, HANS KELSEN AND
HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 22-23 (1997) (citation omitted).

Lon Fuller's discussion of the statute retroactively legitimating the Roehm
Purge is illustrative of this use of law. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, supra note
33, at 650.
40

41 See DYZENHAUS, supra note 39, at 5 ("[L]egal positivism, while
not exactly paving
the way for Nazism, offered no legal resource which could be used to resist a fascist
seizure of power in Germany.").
42 B6ckenf6rde, supranote 23,
at 58-59.
43 See id. at 66 ("The change from a 'formal' to a
'material' concept of the

Rechtsstaat arose out of a tendency that first appeared during the final years of the
Weimar Republic: namely, the abandonment ofjudicial positivism.").
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it is anything but formalist."' Instead, the elaboration of the rule of
law as a constitutionalprinciple is at least as much about when a judge
is justified in invoking constitutional principles to understand (or
invalidate) statutes as it is about ensuring integrity of the formal legal
order in general.
The Sora'a case produced what is perhaps the German
Constitutional Court's most sweeping statement of what the rule of
4
In this
law means in contemporary German jurisprudence. '
constitutional complaint resulting from ajudgment in a libel case, the
Constitutional Court had to decide whether a decision of an ordinary
court to add a remedy to the civil code when the plain language of the
civil code excluded such a remedy was a violation of the constitutional
right of the party ordered to undertake the remedy. At the outset, it
would seem that an advocate of the rule of law would say that, of
course, a judge cannot add a remedy where it is flatly forbidden by
statute. On the facts of the case, 6 however, it was troubling that the
civil code failed to provide a remedy for such an egregious breach.
Upholding the ordinary judge and allowing the remedy upset the
predictability of the private law and required special justification. A
purely fonnalist reading of the rule of law would have counseled
against it. But instead, the German Constitutional Court took the leap
and extended constitutional principles to override the literal wording

Set CURRIE, supra note 22, at 18-20 (explaining the fundamental role of the
.1
]ckslfvaat in judicial review); KOMMERS, supra note 23, at 36-37 (same).
I'Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court]
34 (1973), 269, translated in RUDOLF SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAw 627 (5th
ed. 1988) [hereinafter Soraya Case].
J"The case involved the Princess Soraya, ex-wife of the Shah of Iran, who had sued
a German new.spaper for publishing an alleged interview with her. The interview
revealed, or at least appeared to reveal, very private facts about the princess's life. In
tact, the transcript was fictitious; the interview had never occurred. The newspaper
nexer checked the account of the freelance journalist who had claimed to have
intcr -ieed the princess, though the newspaper later published a brief retraction
saving that the interview was a complete fake. The princess sued the newspaper, but
the German Civil Code prevented money damages from being awarded in cases where
the harm uas merely dignitary and did not infringe on some property right of the
plaintift. Nonetheless, the trial court had awarded money damages, and the
neuxspaper brought a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court, claiming
that cionstitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press was violated by this deviation
our the literal words of the Code. There were two strong constitutional principles on
fithe (other side, however: the right of human dignity and the right to the development
personality of the individual who was harmed. So even though this was a private law
(of
matter, there were strong constitutional interests on both sides of the case. Id. at 62728.
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of the civil code in this case, 47 explicitly invoking the Rechtsstaat
principle in the Basic Law:
The judge is traditionally bound by the Gesetz (written law). This is an
inherent element of the principle of separation of powers, and thus of
the rule of law. Our Constitution, however, [in the Rechtsstaat-orruleof-law-clause] ... has somewhat changed the traditional formulation by
providing that the judge is bound by "Gesetz und Recht" [i.e., written law
[Recht is also sometimes translated as justice.]
and (other) law].
According to the generally prevailing view, this implies the rejection of a
narrow positivistic approach predicated solely upon the written law....
Under certain circumstances there can be law beyond the positive norms
enacted by the State-law which has its source in the constitutional legal
order as a meaningful, all-embracing system, and which functions as a
corrective of the written norms .... The judge's task is not confined to
the ascertainment and implementation of decisions made by the
legislator; he may be called upon, through an act in the nature of a value
judgment... to bring to light and to realize in his decisions those value
concepts which are immanent in the constitutional legal order, but
which are not, or not adequately, expressed in the language of the
written laws. In performing this task, the judge must guard against
arbitrariness; his decision must be based upon rational argumentation.
He must make it clear that the written law fails to perform its function of
providing ajust solution for the legal problem at hand. Where this is so,
the gap thus found is filled by the judge's decision in accordance with
practical4 reason and the "community's established general concepts of
justice." 8
On first pass, this may sound like the opposite of the rule of law
because the judge has the power to move beyond the positive law to
give voice to norms that are "immanent in the constitutional legal
order," unsettling what the positive law literally says. But immediately,
47The court allowed the remedy of money damages, weighing
the claim of
freedom of press against the constitutionally protected right of the development of
personality. The court also went to great lengths to show that the particular provision
of the civil code that the newspaper was urging the court to read literally had been
subject to academic criticism almost from the moment of its publication, and that
courts in other countries in general rejected such a limitation of remedies. In
addition, the court noted that the civil code itself embedded a personality right
elsewhere, so that the private law and not just the constitutional law recognized the
claim on the other side of the newspaper's case. Finally, the court noted that this case,
while laying out general principles that would allow constitutional logic to apply to the
private law, also carried limits. Only when there was this sort of strength of moral
claim on one side and the absence of defense on the other, and when the civil law
incorporated the principles supporting the nonliteral claim and when there had been
this history of criticism of the civil law provision and the absence of support in
comparative law, could the court be justified in departing from the rules laid down. Id.
at 636-38.
48 Id. at 635-36 (citations omitted) (second bracketed
alteration in original).
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this power is qualified by outlining the practical responsibilities of the
constitutional judge as she does this. Checking statutes against
constitutional norms is a well-defined exercise of judicial power in a
constitutional legal system because the judge is required to specify
clearly the legal problems to be remedied (in this specific case, the
gaps in the law) and then to invoke "practical reason '' 49 and ideas
aboutjustice that are located notjust in the court or in the text but in
the broader community. This means that the judge is constrained not
only by a theory of constitutional interpretation or by having the
appropriate attitude toward the text of the law, such as it is. Instead,
the judge is constrained also by her responsibilities to those to whom
the law is directed-specifically the litigants, but also those who form
the community into which the decision comes as an intervention in a
concrete legal dispute.
In a situation in which the positive law fails to concretely
recognize important values expressed elsewhere in the law, the ruleof-law principle, as elaborated in the Soraya case, instructs the judge
not to consider the situation in a purely mechanical way. If the
constitution requires that the positive law be supplemented or even
changed, the judge must follow constitutional principles in doing so,
while taking extra steps to ensure that the alteration of the positive law
is not arbitrary, is accompanied by rational argument and is clear.
These responsibilities are part of the constitutional order that grants
the constitutional judge her power. The judge must be able to
account for what she has done in a way that takes into account the
legitimate expectations of the litigants and also appeals to
constitutional values that clearly predate the action that is being
judged. And then, finally, the norms the judge applies must be
immanent in the law also.' In doing all of this, the judge must
constantly consider whether this decision can be justified to these
litigantsas well as to this community on the basis of principles clearly in
;"While the idea of practical reason may introduce more
trouble than it fixes in
,-American jurisprudence, this idea has a special resonance in German jurisprudence
because the idea of the Rechtsstaat had its origins during the Enlightenment in the
triumph of reason over theocratic or despotic ideas about the state. It is therefore a
more helpful and determinate idea in the German intellectual context. B6ckenforde,
%Upraonote23, at 52.
The Solaya case suggests that the values must be immanent not only in the
constitutional order of values but also in the s)stem of statutes that regulate the matter
in question, even if the positive law says nothing directly on the matter. See Soraya Case,
%upranote 45, at 633 (analyzing the addition of a right to the development of
personality to the Civil Code in the 1950s).

1382

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 149:1361

evidence before the decision was made. In short, the judge is to be
guided by a responsibility to the audience for the decision and not just
to the requirements of the text.5'
In the Soraya case, the German Constitutional Court used the
Rechtsstaat principle not to justify living within the plain words of the
statute but precisely to justify intervention to undermine the literal
meaning of the civil code. But doing this was clearly recognized by
the Court as an exceptional act, subject to a higher burden of
justification than would typically be the case. In acting apparently to
unsettle the law, however, the constitutional judge had to look to the
constitutional principles at stake, to the history of that provision of the
civil code, to societal developments since the code was written, and
even beyond domestic law to the way that such issues were resolved
elsewhere. It may be, as the Constitutional Court thought in the
Soraya case, that the more settled principles of law were the ones that
the statute did not literally give voice to but were instead principles
that were more broadly embodied in the hierarchy of constitutional
values.5 2
Rule-of-law principles give weight to the certainty and
predictability of the law. Usually that means following the statutes as
written. But occasionally-very occasionally-the argument may be
made that a statute, taken literally, undermines settled expectations
and widely understood public values more than it gives voice to them.
And a rule-of-law judge cannot be so bound to the literal wording of
the law that she misses the broader constitutional point. But even
constitutional law cannot be used as a tool of abuse.
If the
constitution requires something where the positive law would seem to
51 One advantage of considering the German construction here is that it may allow

Americans to see more clearly the issues of judicial power in a constitutional order
without immediately collapsing them into questions of interpretation-whether s trict
construction, Framers' intent, or a normatively driven legal theory of first principles.
The German debate focuses more clearly on the responsibilities of the judge in a
constitutional order regardless of the method of constitutional analysis the judge
favors. Of course, all standards, including nonarbitrariness, rational argumentation,

and clarity give rise to interpretive problems of their own, but they have a very
different function in the German constitutional order than theories of interpretation
have in the American one. They explain the obligations of the judge to the ultimate
audience for the decisions, not the relationship of the judge to the text.
52 The right of human dignity and the right to the development of personality,
both of which were also given meaning in different provisions of the civil code, took
precedence here over the claim by the newspaper that the remedy had not been
written into the statute. The case also implied that the freedom of expression that the
newspaper enjoyed did not have such strong protection in a case such as this in which
the newspaper had published a complete fabrication without checking its source.
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indicate the opposite, filling in the legal gap must be done in such a
way that the legitimate expectations of the litigants and the broader
community are not themselves violated in the course of correcting a
constitutional violation. This is not the old positivist conception of
the rule of law speaking. It is a conception of the rule of law with a
great deal of positive substance.
Of course, meeting the expectations of litigants and the broader
community sounds all well and good, except for the fact that it is
usually impossible. If the litigants could have agreed on general
principles for resolving their dispute, they wouldn't be seeking an
answer from a court. And if there were neutral principles that
everyone could agree upon, we would have found them by now. So
what could it mean that courts are supposed to look at the effects of
the law on the litigants and the broader community to work out when
a statute is abusive in present form and needs to be constitutionally
supplemented?
The answer to this question is not going to come in the form of a
general principle, but instead can be found in a careful weighing of
the case-specific, all-things-considered context. Here, the Constitutional Court's reasoning in the Soraya case gives us some clue
about how this can be done. In the Soraya case, the Court obviously
disappointed the newspaper, which thought it was on firm ground, in
opposing a penalty that was not provided for in the civil code. But it
also was probably not surprising to the newspaper that legal
consequences followed from publishing a false account that it had
never checked. So while, in general, finding a remedy where none is
written is something a court should not do, finding a remedy where
the absence of one is truly odd is not so striking. Here, the newspaper
had a strong positivist legal defense-the law did not provide a
remedy for the plaintiff. But the newspaper was on morally shaky
ground and, given the strong protections of the right of human
dignity and the right to the development of personality in German
constitutional law, it was therefore on constitutionally shaky ground as
well. It would be hard to imagine anyone claiming that the newspaper
had a right to publish falsehoods in a situation in which it had not
made the most elementary inquiries about their truthfulness.
Whatever conception of freedom of the press one has, it probably
comes with at least some ideas about the responsibility of an
institution with such great social power to engage in at least minimal
attempts to check the facts that it prints. It seems a blind spot in
German positive law that would allow the newspaper to escape liability

1384

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 149:1361

in that case. The Court justified its decision by pointing to decades
of academic criticism of this flaw in the statute, noting that most other
similar countries in fact provided remedies in a case like this, that the
rights vindicated by the remedy were embedded not only in the
constitution but in the civil code as well, and that the specific
egregious conduct of the newspaper could not have been reasonably
expected to be without consequence. It is just such an extraordinary
case, when a statute has missed something that constitutional
principle seems to require, that the constitutional principle can
supplement or substitute for the statute without adding a new rule-oflaw violation. But these judgments cannot be made on the basis of
broad principles pulled out of the air. Instead, they need to be made
by considering closely just why the positive law may have failed in the
particular case and providing reasons that are multiple, overlapping,
and reliant on principles that everyone can recognize as preexisting
the dispute.
B. Defining the Rule ofLaw in Postcommunist ConstitutionalLaw

One finds a similarly thick and similarly anti-positivist rule-of-law
conception in postcommunist societies as well, precisely because they
too have experienced the disaster that results from believing that
positive law is necessarily deeply legitimate. In the Soviet Union and its
satellites, the signature legal innovation of the Stalinist era was the
spread of show trials, perfectly scripted events in which the law
appeared to be scrupulously followed and the evidence seemed to be
perfectly clear.54 One could not fault show trials for their lack of
attention to law, taken superficially. But of course, they were deeply
antilegal demonstrations of the raw unchecked power of the state
53The Soraya case was not met with uniform joy in the German legal community,
though the court relied on a long-standing history of criticism within the legal

community of the concrete statutory provision in making its argument. The criticism
was not about the result; even critics of the court did not defend the newspaper's

conduct. The criticism was about the difficulties of limiting the principle to just the
sort of case that the Soraya case represented. The subsequent history of the SoraYa

jurisprudence has shown that the Constitutional Court did not intend for its decision
to mean that positive law was under a general threat and, in fact, the German
Constitutional Court has done this sort of thing quite rarely. For a summary of the

criticism of the Soraya decision in English, see CURRIE, supra note 22, at 116-21.

A See generally ALAJOS DORNBACH, THE SECRET TRIAL OF IMRE NAGY (1994)

(detailing the way in which the "post-revolution regime fashioned 'legal means' to
subvert the popular will"); GEORGE H. HODOS, SHOw TRIALS: STALINIST PURGES IN
EASTERN EUROPE, 1948-1954 (1987) (detailing the history of show trials against
communists during the early postwar years in the soviet satellite nations).
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because the), depended on tortured prisoners agreeing to invented
facts.
Outside of these public displays of soviet legality, anti-legalism
through superficial adherence to law continued in many ways great
and small. The typical legal problem of state socialism was not the
absence of law but, rather, its stunning, coercive pervasiveness in daily
life.
Most soviet-style governments were characterized by an
"overregulation" which seemed endemic to the soviet conception of
the state. There was not just one law that applied in a particular
matter but a dozen-each with contradictory implications so that it
would be difficult if not impossible to follow all the laws
simultaneously. With so much law around, the ordinary person could
not help but break at least some of it; there were so many
contradictory rules and regulations that following one almost
necessarily meant breaking anotheri' Such overregulation also gave
enormous power to those who had the discretion to enforce the law,56
because they chose which laws to emphasize and which to ignore
when laws conflicted. When the laws don't form a coherent order,
one may get the appearance of law but the experience of abuse
because it is up to the discretion of the state official which particular
rule takes precedence at the particular moment. In the newly
democratic regimes emerging from soviet domination, a substantively
strong constitutional idea animating the rule of law is one of the hardwon accomplishments of the new legal order. 7
Postsoviet constitutional courts, particularly those in East-Central
Europe, have made serious use of their rule-of-law clauses, animated
by this history of abuse of formal law. But they have made use of these
., Elemer Hankiss, The Loss of Responsibility, in THE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
)F IN1ELLECTULkLS 29, 46 (Ian Maclean et al. eds., 1990) ("East European societies are
notoriously and hopelessly overregulated... creat[ing] a chaotic situation where there
are already too many contradictory and self-contradictory regulations.").
Sre .rnerally Istvdn R6v, Uncertainty as a Technique of the Exercise of Power: An
Appirach to th Question of Transition, 29 WORLD FUTURES 47 (1990).
Jiti Piifi noted that in the Czech Velvet Revolution of 1989:

The revolutionary vocabulary, besides its other features, was accompanied by a
legal positivistic vocabulary demanding the re-establishment of legality, due
process of law and generally binding impartial procedures. Legal positivism
and a formal legalist approach had a strong critical force because qualities of
law such as the regularity, foreseeability, security, iterability, or integrityusually mentioned by legal positivists in their functionalist understanding of
systems of positive law-became
autonomy and security.

important values defending individual

Ji-i Piihi, LIgtimacy and Legality After the Velvet Revolution, in THE RiU OF LAW IN
CENTRAL EUROPE 29, 45-46 (Jiff Pfibdfi &James Young eds., 1999) (citation omitted).
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clauses in anything but a formalistic way. Poland's Constitutional
Tribunal, which had to operate until 1997 without a fully revised
constitution, read practically a whole way of legal life into the rule-oflaw clause that was added to the constitution as part of a package of
amendments in 1989. The Constitutional Tribunal grabbed the first
opportunity to interpret the rule-of-law clause to forbid the retroactive
application of laws and to guarantee rights. 8 In 1993, for example,
every decision in which the Constitutional Tribunal declared a statute
to be unconstitutional invoked the rule-of-law clause. The rule-of-law
clause in the transitional Polish constitution was filled in quickly with
a set of real substantive values, and the core idea in the set was that
the law itself could not be used as a tool of abuse. As one of the
justices of the Polish Constitutional Court, writing with an American
legal scholar, noted, "The Rechtsstaat ('state ruled by law') principle,
rooted in nineteenth-century German legal culture, maintains that
positive law should be consistent with fundamental rules of justice,
fairness, and equity."60 Whether or not the Rechtsstaat meant this in
nineteenth-century Germany is beside the point; what is important is
that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in fact believed that this is
what it meant for a constitutional state to be ruled by law. Ironically,
as in the Soraya case, the principle is invoked most often in Poland just
when a statute is about to be declared unconstitutional, or when
positive law is found wanting for failure to give voice to more general
principles of constitution-based justice. A purely positivist and
formalist reading of the rule of law would counsel just the opposite in
those cases.
In Slovenia, too, the rule-of-law clause has also been invoked very

frequently in ruling on the constitutionality of legislation. The ruleof-law clause there has been held to require "a coherent legal system,
free of contradictions,"6 ' and to require the "principle of notice" so
that "legal postulates for the treatment and conduct of legal subjects
[are] determined in advance or should at least be determinable."' '
Moreover, "[tihe legal treatment of citizens by the State must be
58

See Mark F. Brzezinski & Leszek Garlicki,JudicialReview in Post-CommunistPoland:

The Emergence ofaRechtsstaat, 31 STAN.J. INT'L L. 13,36 (1995) (quoting the Tribunal
as stating that "'nonretroactivity of law is one of the principles of a state based on rule
of law"').
5 Id. at 42.
Id. at 35.
ARNE MAVI6, SLOVENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEw: ITS POSITION IN THE
WORLD AND ITS ROLE IN THE TRANSITION TO A NEw DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 108 (1995).
62 Id. at

109.
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rational and foreseeable... which is why restricting conditions should
not be unclear and incomplete." The logic of the rule of law also
"demands that statutory solutions be general and abstract."" But
here, too, rule-of-law principles are invoked precisely in moments
when the Constitutional Court is about to say that a statute is
unconstitutional.
In Hungary, as former Constitutional Court President Ldszl6
S61yom wrote: "Of all constitutional principles, the rule of law played
a special, symbolic role: it represented the essence of the system
change, being the watershed between the nondemocratic,
nonconstitutional, socialist system and the new constitutional
democracy." '"-' The court promoted the apparently paradoxical idea of
the "rule-of-law revolution,""' meaning that the revolutionary element
of law in the new legal order would be precisely that law could not
itself be changed in a revolutionary fashion. Legal continuity (state
socialist era laws were presumed to be valid unless explicitly found to
be unconstitutional) and legal security (law reform could not happen
so quickly that it made it impossible for people to adjust in a
reasonable manner) guided the transition in Hungary.
The Hungarian constitutional principle of legal security animated
all of its rule-of-law decisions. Having lived through the state socialist
times, the justices of the Constitutional Court clearly believed that the
regularity, predictability, and coherence of the law was far more than
a formal guarantee; it was the hallmark element that indicated that
the political realm had really changed. The new commitment to the
rule of law gave substantive meaning to guarantees of rights and the
separation of powers. Citizens had an affirmative constitutional
protection not to be the subject of state experiments that operated
through sudden changes of law. Instead, citizens had rights derived
from the principle of legal security to have notice of changes in laws,
to have time to adjust to new legal requirements, and not to be caught
in the crossfire between changing or contradictory laws. And yet, the
principle of legal security was typically used not to defend positive law,
but instead to strike down statutes as unconstitutional.

Id. at 137.

Id. at 169.
LiszJ6 S61yom, Introduction to Decisions of the ConstitutionalCourt of the Republic of
Huituarv, in LxSZL SOLYOM & GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEw
Dr.\cnTR\C: THE HUNGARLXN CONSTITrTIONAL COURT 1, 38 (1999).
id,
Id. at 38-40.
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What is going on here? Have the new constitutional democracies
gone constitution mad and forgotten the wise counsel that the law
should be stable and certain, that judicial review should be used
sparingly, that overconstitutionalization of law may be too much of a
good thing?
Constitutional courts in East-Central Europe have
declared many statutes unconstitutional, and they have done much of
this, perhaps even more bizarrely, in the name of the rule of law. To
see what is going on here, it is worth noting just what sorts of laws are
being struck down in the name of the rule of law, because the specifics
tell a more compelling story than the general principles can.
In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal used the rule-of-law clause
in a set of pension reduction cases, saying that the law could not
retroactively change pensions so as to require retirees to pay money
back into the treasury but could be applied prospectively only. Even
in prospective application, however, law could not affect rights that
had already vested, since the maintenance of stable expectations was
critical in a rule-of-law state. The new pension laws that radically
revised the system as part of shock therapy were, therefore, struck
down.
In Slovenia, the rule-of-law clause was extensively used
precisely to police the constitutionality of the transitional laws that
bridged the gap between one sort of regime and another. For
example, the rule-of-law clause was used to strike down legislation that
removed certain communist-era legal protections for those who lived
in communes without substituting another stable legal framework
under which commune dwellers' individual legal rights would be
clear.69 The Slovenian Constitutional Court also, in the name of the
rule of law, struck down a statute which picked out only certain
specified plots of land and allowed them to be passed on to heirs
through the new inheritance laws. Other equivalent plots of land
were left out of this scheme because the privatization of land was
incomplete, and therefore arbitrary distinctions had to be made if
68 Brzezinski & Garlicki, supra note 58, at 36-37. In the case of ordinary citizens,
the state was not allowed to change the formula by which pensions had been
calculated, even if such formulas were changed by law. Those were rights that had
vested because they were generally granted and had been relied upon-and therefore
they could not be altered even by law. Id. at 39. Later the court was forced to relent,
upholding cuts in welfare payments because of the dire economic state of the country
which required "necessary departures from this principle." But the court retained the
right to review the state budget to see whether in fact such welfare payments indeed
had to be cut. Id. at 40. It was clear, however, that the court tried constitutional
remedies against statutory enactments to prevent the welfare of Polish citizens from
succumbing to the personal shocks of shock therapy.
69MAV6t6, supra note 61, at 118-20.
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anything was to be done quickly.7 0 Similarly in Hungary, the
Constitutional Court used the concept of the rule of law (or the
entailed idea of legal security) to strike down attempts at retroactive
crirninalization of offenses that had been committed in the soviet era
but that had not been prosecuted for political reasons. 71 Later, the
Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down parts of the IMFmandated austerity program that gutted welfare rights overnight,
using the theory that people needed to be given time to adjust to the
new economic order.72 The court often used the principle of legal
security as a basis for preventing sudden legal changes from coming
into effect. Sometimes the court also used the principle of legal
security to engage in prospective overruling of statutes that were
already in operation, declaring these laws to be unconstitutional but
setting a time in the future when they would be nullified so that there
would not be7 simply
a destabilizing gap in the law caused by a decision
"
of the court.

i

The rule of law in postcommunist constitutional regimes has
come to stand for a rejection of laws that rapidly unsettle
expectations, push people into poverty by suddenly cutting their
pensions or welfare benefits without giving them time to adjust, alter a
formerly comprehensive legal scheme but only partially (so that
certain people are left out arbitrarily), or attempt retroactive
applications of the law. What all of these things share is what we
might call law-abuse-they are changes that citizens may well consider
abuse carried out under cover of law. What the state does in these
cases has been done pursuant to a properly enacted law, but,
simultaneously, the state has also pulled the rug out from under
people who had long expected things to be different, or who had
ordered their lives according to one set of state commitments, only to
discover that they could not rely on the promises that were made. In
Id. at 137-38.
Decision 11/1992: 5 March 1992, On Retroactive Criminal Legislation, translated in
SOLYOM & BRUNNER, supra note 65, at 214-28; see also Gdbor Halmai & Kim Lane
Scheppele, Living Wll Is the Best Revenge: The HungarianApproach toJudging the Past, in
TIRXNSITIONAL JUsTICE AND THE RULE OF Lk IN NEw DEMOCRACIES 155 (A. James
McAdams ed., 1997) (explaining that the Hungarians refused to go back and
prosecute past crimes because they adopted the view that "the best way to deal with
those who operated ouside the rule of law.., is to refuse to follow the outlaw state's
own inner logic of arbitrariness and disregard for individual self-determination").
-D,cision 43/1995: 30June 1995, On Social SecuritY Benefits, translatedin SOLYOM &
BRUNNER, supra note 65, at 322-32.
7 Liszl6 S61yom, Introduction to the Decisions of the ConstitutionalCourt
of the Republic
ifHungamy, in SULYOM & BRLNNER, supra note 65, at 1, 41.
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transitional regimes, when a great deal of legal reform is being pushed
through at once, it has been the rule-of-law principle that has
prevented these legal changes from turning citizens into human
subjects whose lives are radically worsened overnight by rapid and
unsettling changes of the law.74 The rule of law has required that the
effects of law on the subjects of the law be taken into account and
moderated when such effects are harsh and sudden, when new laws
change well-understood ground rules without notice, when new laws
propose applying after the fact a law that wasn't in place at the time
actions were committed, or when they put citizens in the crossfire of
contradictory legal commands because the law reforms are partial and
fail to comprehensively redefine a coherent legal world in which
citizens can live. In short, the rule of law has been used often in
postcommunist polities to strike down statutes (and not just the old
soviet-era statutes). It has also come to stand for the proposition that
the human subjects of law must themselves be taken into account in
assessing whether law's effects are fair, reasonable, moderate, stable,
and certain. The formerly formal rule-of-law virtues of predictability,
certainty, and stability are still part of this new rule-of-law ideal, but
they are far from merely formal guarantees. They are now guarantees
that even the law will treat citizens with respect.
C. The New Rule of Law
This

is just a

small

taste

of

comparative

constitutional

74 Some commentators have criticized this practice by calling

the variou
constitutional courts that have acted in this way insufficiently postcommunist. For
example, see Andr-ds Saj6. How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform, E. EUR.
CONsT. REv., Winter 1996, at 31, 31 ("The social and political consequences of its 1995
social welfare decisions indicate that the rule of law and constitutional arrangements
indeed play an obstructionist role, preventing changes to the inherited welfare
system."). But when constitutional courts have done this, as in the cases mentioned
above, they have not blocked the transitional laws altogether. Rather, they have slowed
down the implementation of radical cuts in social rights, required safety nets when
programs are abolished, ensured that all citizens be treated equally before new
programs can be put in place, and generally ensured that the transition to a new form
of economy and polity take into account the effects of these policies on those subject
to them. While it is impossible to tell cause and effect here, it is notable that the
relatively aggressive constitutional courts of Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia have been
located in societies in which citizens have not felt the brunt of economic changes as
severely as they have felt such changes in societies in which constitutional courts were
not so active on these subjects (for example, Russia, Ukraine, Croatia, and Sloiakia).
The countries in which courts have aggressively intervened to protect people from
economic experimentation are precisely the countries on the fast-track to European
integration.
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jurisprudence on the rule of law. But despite the differences in
constitutional traditions, contemporary constitutional texts, and
concrete cases that have arisen before these various courts, there is
clearly a core set of substantive principles for which the rule of law has
come to stand in contemporary post-horror constitutional
democracies. Unlike earlier formalistic rule-of-law conceptions, the
modem conception introduces into constitutional jurisprudence the
idea of the legal subject with legitimate expectations who is the real
audience for the constitutional decision. Respecting such a legal
subject is a high constitutional value. Respecting the legal subject
requires that she be in the forefront of the judge's mind as the judge
applies the law to her and it further requires that judicial elaboration
of the law take into account its effects on those who based their goodfaith actions on the law that appeared to exist at the time their actions
were taken. The legal subject, deserving respect, must have a sense
that the law predates the actions that are judged under this law;7 5 that
the law is capable of being understood and followed; that law does not
require impossible or contradictory things; and that, if there is a gap
in the law, it will be filled in using more general principles that are
also knowable in advance. If the law is broken to the point where it
cannot be fixed, a new set of legal principles cannot be retroactively
put in place to require of the legal subject 20/20 foresight.
One objection that can be made to this picture is that there is
always more than one legal subject, and legal subjects may disagree. If
it were so easy to work out one single clear set of expectations that
legal subjects have, then judging would not be as complicated or
conflictual as it is. The deep pluralism of most modem societies
argues against the view that "the legal subject" is a meaningful unitary
term for judges to use in determining what legitimate expectations
are. What do constitutional courts, confronted with complicated
societies full of disagreement over basic values and with diversity
7-1 This concern with the predictability of the law was echoed
byJeremy Bentham
in his scathing critique of the common law method:
It is the judges... that make the common law. Do you know how they make
it? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you
want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is
the Nvay you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law
for you and me. The), won't tell a man beforehand what it is he should not
d,-they won't so much as allow of his being told; they lie by till he has done
something which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for

it.
JF.REXi' BEN rHAM,

5 WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (John Bow-ing ed., Russell &
Russell, Inc. 1962) (1808).
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among legal subjects, do?
Disagreement cannot be wished away by theory. Nonetheless,
disagreement may be better understood through a more specific
analysis of context and through generating the kind of multiple and
overlapping understandings of what conflictual events mean to those
who are affected. This argues against a priori general resolutions of
constitutional issues and counsels instead that the business of
substituting constitutional principle for purely statutory resolution is
one that requires both deep knowledge of the particular uses of the
laws in question and clear justifications for declaring those laws to be
unconstitutional by reference to the limiting facts of the particular
circumstances.
For example, in the postcommunist pension cases, which have
similar shape all over Eastern Europe, judges are not (as their critics
claim) just developing a theory of positive rights with a nostalgic
attitude toward communism and defying more liberal or libertarian
senses of constitutionalism. Instead, judges are responding to a
situation in which the present-day pensioners who bring these
complaints had no choice through their lives but to live under a state
policy that required everyone to depend on the state for their
retirement income. The ability to save was limited in the soviet time;
there were no other provisions for private creation of a retirement
fund.
Hyperinflation and bank collapses in the new market
economies have often wiped out what savings people managed to
amass. For people who were positively not allowed to plan for their
old age, it seems particularly cruel for the state now to uphold the
values of a market economy and the virtues of privatization when it is
too late for pensioners to relive their lives to plan accordingly. The
same rationale will not apply to generations that come later,
generations that have had other options in life. So it is probably not
accurate to say that the constitutional courts of Eastern Europe have a
certain nostalgic fondness for social rights; instead, it is a specific
sense of the rule of law that requires constitutional courts to validate
the legitimate expectations of those who could do nothing else but
depend on the state's promises to take care of them into their
retirement years. Holding the functional disappearance of pensions
to be unconstitutional relies on a specific analysis of a specific history
in which the current complainants, through no fault of their own, are
now desperate because of broken promises. This is not a view of the
rule of law that blocks all future changes.
In the rule-of-law cases that I have just reviewed, a full-blown
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theory, of general principles that indicate when the rule of law may be
invoked in this substantive way may not be necessary. Constitutional
courts in all of these cases are reviewing the constitutionality of laws in
light of specific complaints brought against statutes in specific
historical moments. The complaints highlight the effects of the
statutes on the complainants, and it is through an assessment of the
statutes' effects that judges determine whether further review is
necessary. If the statutes have the effect of promoting not stability but
ruin, not predictability but arbitrariness, not due notice but surprise,
then the courts need to look further to see whether the laws in
question produce these effects in ways that impinge on
constitutionally guaranteed rights. The rule-of-law analysis is a way of
pointing to how the complainant in a particular case has been treated
by law and of asking whether the complainant has rights guaranteed
elsewhere in the law that makes the complained-of treatment illegal or
unconstitutional. If there are such rights, then the law itself may be
unconstitutional in the name of the rule of law.
The rule of law does not and cannot guarantee the absolute
predictability of concrete legal decisions in advance; such
predictability would be either impossible or mechanical in ways that
would be objectionable on other grounds. But it should at least make
such decisions comprehensible when they are renderedcomprehensible as nonarbitrary, good-faith understandings of a stable
order of law that takes note when citizens experience harm through
law. But the rule of law, in its modern antiformalist version, requires
that the subject of the law and not just the text of the law appear in
the judge's field of vision. After the twentieth century's legal horrors,
the new century's conception of a rule-of-law state is defined not by
formalistic requirements but instead by a robust, substantive
jurisprudence that takes the legal subject and her legitimate
expectations seriously and does not use the legal subject as an
opportunity for legal experimentation.
What could this new substantive rule-of-law jurisprudence in other
countries possibly have to do with the painful election that America
has just experienced? Surely, American courts are not bound by
principles taken from other jurisdictions. And surely, America
doesn't have the specific concrete history of engaging in mass abuse
against its own citizens through law that seems to have led other
countries to be suspicious of formalist understandings of the rule of
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law." But Election 2000 poses many of the problems that we see in
newly emerging democracies committed to constitutionalism and the
rule of law, starting with a flawed statute that had not been previously
tested before its application mattered a lot, going through a series of
court decisions that could not find a stable way to determine what to
do with the law's flaws, and ending up with a whipsawing set of
judgments that left everyone on both sides,77 even those who turned
out to be the winners in the end, with a sense that the law itself had
failed us badly. Through Election 2000, Americans had some glimpse
of the "law abuse" that much of the rest of the world has long known.
Looking back over the fight after Election 2000, it is the fact that
law couldn't explain the results of the most visible court decisions that
has produced the sense that politics, and not law, was doing all of the
work. But the Florida election law had real gaps and contradictions;
courts differed in the clarity with which they acknowledged that fact
and tried to find a principled way to solve the problem. Given the
partisan nature of the dispute itself, it would have been hard for any
court to find a strategy for judicial decisionmaking that would have
been accepted as not directly partisan, given that any ground would

have provided a particular outcome and the legitimacy of the ground
for the decision would have been traced by the partisans to the

Of course, there are those of us who believe that America has exactly this
history, but this seems to be a minority view in the United States at the moment. It is
difficult to square America's nonrandom pockets of extreme poverty, the continuing
discrimination against already-disadvantaged groups, homelessness, lack of medical
care, inadequate education, and a lack of opportunity for a large part of the American
population with the rights allegedly guaranteed to all. But America's social problems
have rarely been understood as a systemic horror, generated by the sort of regime we
have. Instead, the causes of many of these social problems are privatized and are
widely seen as the fault of the individuals affected. If these social problems were
recognized as being the byproducts of the sort of political and economic system that
we have and also as being the byproducts of the sort of legal protection that we offer
people who are disadvantaged, America might have a very different understanding of
the rule of law-to say nothing of a more humane society. But I will save that
argument for another day.
71 While I will concentrate primarily on the whipsawing that the U.S. Supreme
Court engaged in here, I understand that many people felt the same whipsawing, from
the Florida Supreme Court in its efforts to find ways to count all of the ballots
identified through Al Gore's selective requests and self-serving proposals. I believe
that neither side was well served by law here, precisely because insufficient attention
was given to these broader substantive rule-of-law issues. Had the Florida court
jettisoned strict reliance on the gap-filled statute early on and substituted a "count
every vote, but count every vote equally-across the whole state" standard, I suspect
that even conservatives would have felt the result to be fair. Or at least it would have
been harder to politicize the recount processes in the same way.
76
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desirability, from their perspective, of the outcome. But when we see
the election wars waged with law as a weapon and the final result
described frequently in the press as a Republican U.S. Supreme Court
pulling rank on a Democratic Florida Supreme Court, the rule of law
is the major loser. And with it, so are we all.
II. THE TWISTED LEGAL LOGIC OF ELECTION 200078
The fateful and fatal legal problems of Election 2000 started ith
a flawed Florida statute that had been recently rewritten and never
tested with all of its new provisions in place." And, unfortunately for
all concerned, the statute was pressed to and beyond its limits.
Florida's election law" was a detailed, apparently comprehensive
statute that provided for many contingencies, but the various pieces
were hard to reconcile and specific guidance was missing in critical
places. The rule-of-law problems in Election 2000 did not grow
primarily out of the facts of the election-though those facts launched
legal challenges in the improbable situation of the complete political
tie across almost all institutions of government. The rule-of-law
problems gTew instead primarily out of the flaws in the statute and the
lack of agreement among courts over what to do ith those flaws.
A. Law's Flaws and the Protest Phase

In Florida, the initial vote count on election night put Bush ahead
of Gore by 1784 votes out of about 6 million votes cast." An automatic
recount, triggered under Florida law because the gap between two
candidates was less than one-half of one percent took place over the
7

The account I give here only discusses those decisions that in some way were the

preambles to the Supreme Court's final decision in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000)
(per curiam). For a comprehensive list of all of the lawsuits, with original documents,
'Ice Robert Crown Law Library, Stanford Law School, Election 2000 Materials, at
http://election2000.stanford.edu [hereinafter Election 2000 Materials]. For a more
extensixe treatment of all of the lawsuits, together ith a discussion of the legal
strategies involved in arguing and judging them, see HOWARD GILLLLAN, THE VOTES
TIHAi COUNTED:

THE UNPRECEDENTED JUDICLAL DECISIONS TiT DECIDED THE

PRESIDENTC' (forthcoming 2001).

The recent legislative modifications for the contest provisions of Florida's
statute are detailed in Gore v. Han-is, 772 So. 2d 1243 (2000). Justice Harding's dissent

in that case noted that in the protest part of the statute, the role of the circuit courts
had been eliminated under the same revisions. Id. at 1270-71 (Harding,J., dissenting).
FL\. STAT.-JN. §§ 97.011-107.11 (West 1982 & West Supp. 2001)
Evt tis DaV by Day, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 14A.
FLI. STAT. AN\rN. § 102.141 (4).
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next week and set the difference between the two primary candidates
at only 300 votes, with Bush barely hanging on to his lead.! After
overseas absentee ballots were counted on November 20, Bush's
advantage again grew, this time to 930 votes. 84 But all of the
differences were vanishingly small in a state where 6 million ballots
were cast and in a national election in which some 100 million people
had voted. 85 Due to the tiny margin between the two candidates'
Florida vote totals, a series of legal challenges was mounted by the
Gore legal team, by the Bush legal team, by various independent
voters, as well as by voters affiliated with each camp.6 These lawsuits
ran quickly into structural defects in Florida's election law.
Statutory Infelicity #1. Florida Statutes Annotated section 102.111
specified that county voting returns must be submitted to the Florida
Department of State seven days after the election or they "shall be
ignored," 87 while section 102.112 specified that they "may be ignored"
under those circumstances. 88 "Shall" implies no discretion; "may"
implies some. This unfortunate drafting infelicity left open the
question: Could (or must) the Secretary of State throw out results
that came in after the deadline, according to the law?
Statutory Infelicity #2. Section 102.166 provided a mechanism for
protesting the election tallies at the county level and, under some
circumstances, provided the option for a manual recount of disputed
ballots.8
But this section of the statute allowed candidates to
challenge the count "prior to the time the canvassing board certifies
the results for the office being protested or within 5 days after
midnight of the date the election is held, whichever occurs later.""'
The problem was timing. If a manual recount were requested just
before the results had to be certified under the deadline set either by
section 102.111 or by section 102.112 or if a recount were requested in
a particularly large county in which manual recounts would take a

83

Events Day by Day, supra note 81. Between the initial count of a 1794-vote gap

and the 300-vote official gap after the automatic recount, Bush's lead steadily dropped
and at one point was as low as 229 votes. Id.
84 Todd S. Purdham & David Firestone, Counting
the Vote: The Florida Supreme
Court,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al.
85Jonathan Ringel, The Election Litigation, by the Numbers, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 11,
2000, at 17.
86 For the detail on these other cases, see Election 2000 Materials,supra note 78.
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111 (West 1982 & West Supp. 2001)
(emphasis added).
Id. § 102.112 (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
88 Id. § 102.166(4) (a).
Id. § 102.166(2) (emphasis added).
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substantial amount of time, then there would be no time to complete
the recount that the law clearly seemed to allow. If the county
performed the recount, it would miss the deadline. That drafting
infelicity left open the question: Did the deadline bend for the
manual recounts, or did the manual recounts bend for the deadline?
The statute itself didn't explicitly say.
Statutory Infelicity #3. The Florida election law is a unitary statute,
meaning that there is, in general, one set of procedures to govern all
types of elections in the state, even though the elections are very
different.' The same protest procedures are outlined for elections for
county sheriff, for governor, for U.S. Congress, and for presidential
electors. But some of those elections are county-based, others are
statewide; some are to state offices, others are to federal posts. The
protest procedure for all of these offices, however, requires that
candidates challenge the vote tallies before the relevant county
canvassing board. -2 Even in a statewide election, there is no
procedure for protesting a statewide vote tally unless one files
separately in every county in the state. And the instructions about
how to respond to the protest petitions from candidates are directed
at count , canvassing boards, which are to look only to their own
county results in figuring out whether such a protest is warranted.>)3
That left open the question: When should (or how could) one file a
statewide protest? And, since a protest in a statewide election must be
",There is one important difference at the "contest" level, where a candidate
may
challenge the certification of election results. Elections to the Florida Senate and
House of Representatives are contested before those bodies themselves, while all other
c)ntests go to the courts. Id. § 102.171.
""This can be seen in id. § 102.166(4) (a), which provides,
"(a]ny candidate whose

name appears on the ballot... may file a written request with the county canvassing
board for a manual recount."

"'Section 102.166(4)(d) further indicates that the county board may
authorize a

sample recount, implying that there is discretion lodged in the board to accept or
reject the request. But the statute gives no standards for the boards' determinations,
leaing open the very real possibility that, even if a candidate challenged a statewide
election by filing in every county, different boards would reach different conclusions

about whether the tallies had to be revisited. This was of particular consequence with
regard to the statutory provision invoked by the Gore team, which allowed the

camassing boards to authorize full manual recounts if the sample manual recount
"indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the
election." Id.§ 102.166(5). If the gap between Gore and Bush had been wider, it
might have been possible for each count), canvassing board, looking at its own county's
results, to say that a recount of its county, by itself, would not have affected the

election. If each one did that, then no one would have recounted even if the vote
totals, when added up across all of the affected counties, would have been sufficient to
change the outcome of the election. But this question did not arise this time.
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mounted by filing at the county level, how could one guarantee that
the same standards were 4used by each county in considering this
challenge across the state?
B. PlayingOut the ProtestPhase
The day after the election, the Gore team decided to challenge
the election returns only in four counties-Volusia, Broward, MiamiDade, and Palm Beach-selected because they had large numbers of
Democratic voters and also because there were indications that a
substantial number of ballots had been rejected by the machines there
as having no vote for president-9 5 If one were trawling for Democratic
At oral argument before the Florida Supreme Court at the protest phase, David
Boies noted that his client had offered to go along with a statewide recount:
Vice-President Gore informally, obviously, he didn't have the power that this
court has, but informally proposed, as the court may or may not be aware, that
he would be prepared to accept a statewide recount. We are not urging that
upon the court. But certainly that is something that we have indicated that we
would accept. And we believe the court has the power to order that.
CNN LIVE EVENT: The Florida Recount. FloridaSupreme Court Holds Hearing on Manual
Recounts (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 20, 2000) (Transcript #00112005V54). At the
contest phase, the Gore team clearly felt that its best strategy was to contest specific
votes in specific counties rather than ask for a statewide recount. David Boies
explained:
This is not a situation in which somebody has simply come in and said we've
lost, we'd like to have a recount under the contest statute. This is a situation
in which we have identified specific votes, many of which were agreed by the
District Court were votes in which you could clearly discern the voter's intent.
Contesting the Vote: Arguments Before the Florida Supreme Court on the PresidentialRecount,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8. 2000, at A34. But Florida Supreme Court Justice Peggy Quince at
oral argument at the contest phase questioned the linkage between contest and
protest, and asked whether the two phases had to have the same general shape. "[11ou
contested these ballots through the original protest. So do you have to have done that
in order to bring a contest:'" Id. Boies's response was that the Gore team was
contesting those same uncounted ballots in the same counties where the protests had
been lodged but, literally speaking, there ws'as nothing in the statute that required that
contests be limited to counties where unsuccessful protests had already been made. As
if to help the Gore side, Justice Barbara Pariente asked Boies whether there had ever
been a statewide recount sought as a remedy in an election contest, and Boies replied
that there had been such a contest in 1916 but not "in the modern era." Id. So while
the statewide recount option was always on the table, it was also always pushed aside in
favor of what a more literal reading of the statute seemed to urge.
": The vigorous dissent by Judge Carnes in Siegel v. LePore,234 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir.
2000) (en banc), challenged the argument that the reason for selecting the particular
counties for a recount was based on the view that every vote should count. Analyzing
the counties where the most undervotes were missed did not turn up the same list of
counties that the Gore team challenged. "Never once in its briefs or in its oral
arguments did the [Democratic] Party suggest that its selection of the 3 punch card
94

counties out of 24 for a manual recount was based on anything other than partisan
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votes, then, this was where they would most likely be. The Gore team
strictly followed the procedure that the statute laid out, because
challenges had to be filed at the county level and there was, as we have
seen, no provision either requiring or even providing for a general
statewide challenge in a statewide race. Not that the Democrats
necessarily preferred a statewide challenge; the county-level challenge
seemed, at the start, to promise them the best results. But the statute
did not push them in that direction either; Gore's challenge was
squarely within the legal framework that the Florida Legislature set
out, though it was questioned by the Bush team precisely because it
was selective. The Republicans continually challenged whether
protesting only in a few counties made sense as a method of
questioning a statewide election, although they showed no signs of
remedying the situation by filing for recounts in all of the counties
where Gore had not already filed. And because the Florida courts felt
that the, had to work with what the statute literally said, Florida's
judges did not (at least at first) believe that they could force such a
procedure on the litigants in the protest phase, although the subject
had come up in the first set of oral arguments. ' The Republicans,
too, were no doubt acting strategically, especially as it emerged in the
news that the highest rates of rejected ballots where a manual recount
would find additional votes were in counties using punch-card
technologies, and those counties were likely to be disproportionately
Democratic."7
Following the Gore team's initial request, each of the targeted
counties took at least a one percent sample of the ballots in at least
three precincts, as Florida law provides, to determine whether the
manually recounted sample might be sufficiently different from the
original tallies to justify a full manual recount."" Broward County's
sample turned up a net four votes for Gore; Palm Beach's sample
self-interest." Id. at 1205.
See supra note 94 (providing statements of the Florida Supreme Court Justices
from oral argument). After the contest was over, Florida Supreme Court Justice
Pariente noted poignantly that the absence of a statewide contest provision was one of
the many features that should be remedied in the Florida election law. But she noted,
too, that the option had been raised in oral argument on November 20, 2000, in Gore
v. Harris,
773 So. 2d 532-33 & n.18 (Fla. 2000).
Josh Barbanel & Ford Fessenden, Contesting the Vote: The
Tools; RacialPattern in
DontfraphicsofError-ProneBallots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at A25.
FLx. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(d) (West Supp. 2001).
Broward's manual recount eventually turned up a net 567 votes for Gore. Legal
Disputes over Florida's Electoral Votes: Key Events, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST,
Dec. 13, 2000, at 964A1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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netted Gore nineteen votes.'" These counties went ahead and started
manual counts because they felt this showed an adequately significant
difference, given the closeness of the election, to warrant it. Volusia
plunged straight into a full recount and, in the end, finished in time
to satisfy the original statutory deadline, though it was not at all sure,
even on the day the counts were due, that it would be able to meet the
deadline. Miami-Dade's canvassing board took a sample and said the
differences it found were not substantial enough to warrant
recounting the whole county. But the board reconsidered later,
started a recount, then decided again against the recount, and
eventually just stopped."' In all the counties, recount processes were
more difficult and took longer than expected because of the large
number of partisan challenges and the extraordinary flood of lawsuits
against the canvassing boards. In addition, the county canvassing
boards were caught in the crossfire because they were getting
conflicting legal advice from the state about what they were supposed
to do.0 2
Throughout, the Bush campaign took the view that manual
recounts were likely to introduce inaccuracies rather than correct
them and argued that allowing "selective" manual recounts in only
some counties and not in others was unfair, biasing the process in
favor of the Democrats. 0 3 So the Bush campaign attempted to block
the manual recounts on this basis by going to federal court with an
100

Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2000).

In the end, Palm Beach found 188 net additional votes for Gore after its full recount.
LegalDisputesover Florida'sElectoralVotes, supra note 99.
101Legal Disputes over Florida'sElectoral Votes, supra note 99. Later vote counts
showed Miami-Dade would not have made much difference to the election. The Palm
Beach Post count showed Bush netting six votes over Gore in Miami-Dade Count,,
while the Miami Herald count said Gore netted forty-nine votes over Bush. Bob
Drogin, Recounts in Miami-Dade Find Bush a Fair Winner, LA. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at
A1O.
102 Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ (Expedited
Consideration Sought),
filed by Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, Palm Beach CountY CanvassingBd., No.
00-2346 (Fla. Nov. 14, 2000), at 2-3, available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/
harrisflscpet.pdf ("Petitioner is uncertain about its rights, responsibilities and duties
under Florida law."). The petition also noted that there were seven lawsuits pending
against board members in either their official or personal capacities at the time that
they filed this petition. Id. at 3 n.1.
103 Bush's chief spokesman in Tallahassee, James Baker, said as the recounts
started: "There are not even any procedures or standards to govern... [a] selectihe
vote count. A manual recount permits the electoral boards in each count) in Florida
to determine the intent of the voter without setting forth any standards at all for
deciding that intent." Baker Calls for "No FurtherRecounts," N.Y. TIrMES, Nov. 12, 2000.
at A24.
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equal protection claim, asking for an emergency injunction. The
district court rebuffed them,"" and ultimately the Eleventh
Circuit, in
0
an en banc decision, rejected the argument as well.16
But while the federal case was working its way through the courts,
Florida's Republican Secretary of State Katherine Harris, who had
served as George W. Bush's campaign co-chair in the general election,
issued an opinion in response to a request from the Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board for clarification of the manual recount
standard, stating that manual recounts should only be performed
when there was a problem of fraud or machine breakdown, not simply
a predictable error rate in the tabulation equipment.'
Florida's
Democratic Attorney General Bob Butterworth, who had been Al
Gore's campaign co-chair, issued, unbidden, a contrary view,"117 and so
the Palm Beach board stopped counting and turned to the Florida
courts for a definitive reading of what standards they were to use in
authorizing a manual recount. Ultimately the Florida Supreme Court
told them that nothing barred their continued counting, and the
Palm Beach board resumed counting after a delay. '"
",Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (denying a motion
for a
temporary re-straining order and injunction). The Bush campaign put forward a
number of Florida voters as the primary plaintiffs here given that, as they noted in
their filing, if an equal protection right exists, it is a right of the voter and not of the
candidate. The emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction was filed on November 11, 2000. But the federal district court refused
relief.
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The original
Palm
Beach County case had been joined with a case coming from Volusia County which
produced separate dissents, Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133 (11 th Cir. 2000).
The majority rejected the equal protection argument as being insufficient tojustify the
remedy sought, to the effect that -[n]o authority from the Supreme Court or the
Eleventh Circuit has been cited to us for the proposition that the irreparable injury
needed for a preliminary injunction can properly be presumed from a substantially
likely equal protection violation.'" Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1177-78 (quoting N.E. Fla.
Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283,
1285 (11 th Cir. 1990)). But Judge Cames's dissent argued that there was a potential
equal protection violation in the unequal error rates of different voting technologies
used in different counties.
Jo".S~cLegal Opinion From Florida Secretary of State To Assist Palm Beach County
Regarding the Recount Deadline, DE 00-13 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/secstatel 114pbc.html.
1,7 Manual Recount of Ballots, No. AGO
2000-65 (Nov. 14, 2000), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/agopinionl 1._14.html.
1- [I]t appears that the relief sought on the question of whether
the
Canvassing Board may conduct a manual recount of the votes cast for
President and Vice President has been answered in the affirmative by the
Circuit Courts of Leon and Palm Beach County. At present, this isbinding
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In the meantime, the clock was still ticking. By the time the Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board resumed their count, the statutory
one-week deadline for submission of election returns was upon them.
The Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, along with the canvassing
boards of Broward and Volusia counties, petitioned the Secretary of
State for an assurance that their manually recounted returns would be
accepted after the deadline. But they were told by the Secretary that
the seven-day deadline was firm and that nothing coming in after that
deadline would be counted in the certified totals.' °o
That generated another lawsuit-this time in Leon County Circuit
Court (seat of the state government)-in which the canvassing boards,
joined by Al Gore, tried to force the Secretary of State to accept late
returns. Judge Terry Lewis noted the conflict between the "may
ignore" and "shall ignore" provisions of the Florida law and decided
that, in light of the manual recount petitions, "may" had to triumph
over "shall." "It is unlikely," wrote Judge Lewis, "that the Legislature
would give the right to protest returns, but make it meaningless
because it could not be acted upon in time.""" As a result, Judge
Lewis ruled that the Secretary in fact had discretion to accept late
returns but, further, that discretion meant that she could not reject
late returns automatically in advance. To exercise discretion properly,
she had to consider "all of the facts and circumstances" that
accounted for the delays."l '
"May" it was, then. Judge Lewis
specifically noted that the statute provided a "contest" option for
challenging results after they had been certified and that one way to
challenge the results was to point to the "'rejection of a number of
legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the
election.""'12 Judge Lewis's opinion strongly suggested, then, that if
the Secretary still chose to ignore results submitted after the deadline,
Gore could contest the certification and get the "legal votes" added to
legal authority on this issue and there is no legal impediment to the recounts
continuing. Thus, Petitioners are authorized to proceed with the manual
recount.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. 00-2346 (Fla. Nov. 16, 2000) (order
allowing recounts to continue), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/002346orderl I16.pdf.
109Secretary of State Harris's opinion regarding the finality of the
election
deadlines can be found at http://election2000.stanford.edu/fll 1-14deadline.pdf.
110 McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, slip op. at 4-5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000)
(granting in part and denying in part a motion for a temporary injunction), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/McDermottHarris.pdf.
"II Id. at
7.
112 Id. at 8 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001)).
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the totals later. One way or another, under Judge Lewis's judgment,
the results of the manual recount would be added to the certified vote
totals."'
Secretary Harris then told the canvassing boards that they needed
to explain, in advance of their submission of late returns, why they
needed an extension of the deadline before she would consider
including the returns if they came in late. The canvassing boards
submitted their reasons and, within hours, Secretary Harris rejected
all of them for failing to state an acceptable ground for missing the
deadline."' Judge Lewis signed off on this by saying that Harris had
done what he had asked in demonstrating an exercise of discretion
considering all of the facts and circumstances and that "[m]y Order
requires nothing more.""5
Quickly, the canvassing boards and the Gore team appealed Judge
Lewis's ruling using a special "pass through" procedure to skip the
intermediate appeals court review. The Florida Supreme Court
immediately issued a stay against the Secretary of State, telling her
that she could not certify the election, as she had planned, until it
considered the claims."' Then the Florida Supreme Court ordered
the case to be briefed, heard oral arguments, and issued a unanimous

1' From a more positivist stance than the one I am urging in this essay,
Judge
Leuis's opinion was the most perceptive of all of the Florida court opinions because it
recognized that results of a legitimately conducted manual recount would have to be
added to the totals-if not, because of deadlines at the certification phase, by the
Secretary of State, then at least at the contest phase through court challenge. Also, by
nflting that the Secretary of State had discretion, rather than a statutory mandate, to
reject late returns, Judge Lewis squarely placed responsibility on the shoulders of an
elected official charged with carrying out the law, who then had to justify her actions in
public view as elected officials should have to do when charged with major public
responsibility. Judge Lewis's opinion cleanly separated the operation of law (in the
contest phase) from the exercise of political discretion (in the protest phase) and did
s4) without doing something obviously activist (or capable of a partisan reading), such
as changing the statutory deadlines or requiring a political official charged with
discretion to do something she didn't want to do. In the political swirl of the time,
neither side was pleased with Judge Lewis's result, and any judgment promising a
consequential result would have been challenged to the bitter end. But Judge Lewis
might hae had the winning framework that kept courts most separate from partisan
politics in those bitter da)s, without going beyond the statute.
I' Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 3-4, McDermott v. Harris, No. 002700, availableat http://election2000.stanford.edu/dmemo2700.pdf.
McDermott v. Harris, slip. op. at 2 (denying emergency motion to compel
compliance ith, and for enforcement of, injunction).
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. SCOO-2346 (Fla. Nov. 17,
20001) (staying order), availableat http://election2O00.stanford.edu/stay.pdf.
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per curiam judgment on November 21, 2000. In its decision, the
court ordered the Secretary to delay certification until November 26,
giving the county canvassing boards additional time to finish their
17
recounts.
The Florida Supreme Court's per curiam opinion grappled with
Statutory Infelicities #1 and #2 in the Florida law and decided, much
as Judge Lewis had, that the "may" language won over the "shall"
language precisely because the manual recount provision would be
meaningless if it were a remedy that a candidate could never use
because a requirement that the deadlines be met was unresponsive to
special circumstances. But the Florida Supreme Court went further
and found that, while the Secretary had discretion to determine what
to do with late tallies in general, she had no discretion to refuse to
accept late tallies under these circumstances. The rationale? Legislative
intent clearly planned for manual recounts to be a real remedy to
correct mistakes in the vote tallies, and, therefore, the legislature
could not have required or even permitted the Secretary to ignore the
results from lawful manual recounts. Thus, while the Secretary could
reject late returns for some reasons, she could not reject late returns
for this reason. The court's analysis was bolstered by its view that the
Florida Constitution, in its Declaration of Rights, placed the right to
vote high in its ordering of constitutional values, and so anything that
ensured that Florida citizens' votes would be given fuller effect took
precedence over rigid statutory deadlines. 8
The Florida Supreme Court's previous order allowing manual
recounts remained in place, so Broward County, at least, had
continued to count. Volusia had finished its recount in time for the
original deadline, so its recount results were poised to be certified in
the results whenever such certification was made. Palm Beach had
again stopped counting, losing valuable time (at least as far as the
Gore forces were concerned) while awaiting legal guidance from the
Florida Supreme Court They began again only after the court came
down with this decision. Miami-Dade, which at first had decided
against a manual recount and then changed its mind, started up again
too. But Miami-Dade stopped when unruly protesters filled the
building where the counting was being done. While the Miami-Dade
board said that they stopped the counting because they thought that

7 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
11 See id. at 1237 ("Technical statutory requirements must not be exalted
over

substance of this right.").

the
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they could not get it done in time even under the extended deadline,
Democrats believed that it was local political officials and the
protestors who pushed the vacillating board out of the fray'
Outraged by the deadline extension which they felt had judicially
altered the legislative scheme and therefore changed the law after the
election, the Bush team petitioned for review by the U.S. Supreme
Court, and, surprisingly to many commentators, 2' the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the petition from the Florida Supreme
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari didn't change
Court.'
things on the ground, for the manual recounts continued in Florida
while the U.S. Supreme Court was awaiting briefs, hearing oral
argument, and preparing its decision. By the time the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision came down on December 4, 122 it seemed grandly
irrelevant. The Florida Secretary of State had certified the results on
November 26, including the manual recounts from Volusia and
Broward counties. Since Palm Beach County had not met this
deadline, its additional votes from a partial recount had been ignored.
And since Miami-Dade had decided to stop recounting altogether, no
new figures were available there either. With all of the jockeying for
advantage in the manual recount battle, Bush had retained his lead
even after the certification deadline had been pushed back by twelve
days, and he didn't seem to need the U.S. Supreme Court to rule for
him in the precertification recount battles anymore. Florida's

1" Later, a story was published in the New York Times purporting to show that there
were a number of local political reasons why the nominally Democratic elected officials
in Miami may not want have wanted to alienate the Republicans on this matter. Don
Van Natta Jr. & Dexter Filkins, Miami Mayor's Role a Riddle in Decision to Halt Recount,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al. Apparently, the protestors had been mobilized by the
Republican organization in Miami-Dade to disrupt the recount process. Dana Canedy
&Dexter Filkins, A Wild Day in Miami, with an End to Recounting and Democrats' Going to
court, N.Y. TIwrs, Nov. 23, 2000, at A31.
1_,Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to hear the case, experts
were
nearly unanimous in saying that the Supreme Court would never get into this because
it u-a clearly a matter of interpretation of state law, raising no substantial federal
questions. See, e.g., CN\N Early Edition: The Florida Recount: State Election Law vs.
Cmstitutional Questions (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 17, 2000) (Transcript
#0111709V08).
I-AThe Bush team had appealed both the PalmBeach County CanvassingBoardcase
from the Florida Supreme Court, in PalmBeach County CanvassingBd. v. Harris,772 So.
2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), and also the denial of an injunction in Siegel v. LePor 120 F. Supp.
2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000). But the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Siegel case, in
which Bush had presented his equal protection argument in fullest form. See Siegel v.
LePore, 121 S. Ct. 510 (2000).
LI" Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000).
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certified totals put Bush's lead at 537 votes. 123 If the certification had
proceeded on the Secretary of State's calendar, his lead would have
been 930 votes, making him the narrow winner in either event.
The Supreme Court's decision and reasoning added to this sense
of relative insignificance at the time. The per curiam unanimous
opinion vacated, but did not reverse, the Florida Supreme Court's
decision and asked the Florida Supreme Court only to clarify the basis
of its decision. Following up on a series of questions asked by Justice
Scalia at oral argument,2 4 the per curiam opinion noted that, while in
general the Court gives great deference to state court interpretations
of state law, this case involved substantial federal questions as well,
particularly those arising under Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the
United States Constitution, which gives the power to determine the
manner of choosing presidential electors to the state legislature' 2 " and
3 U.S.C. § 5, which, in the view of the Court, "would counsel against
any construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to
be a change in the law."' 2 6 The Court expressed concern that the
Florida Supreme Court might have relied on the state constitution to
constrain the power of the legislature to determine the manner of
choosing presidential electors, which the Court implied might be
prohibited by the federal Constitution.1 7 Therefore, strict construction of the election statute without recourse to general state
constitutional principles seemed wisest course of action for the
Florida Supreme Court.
But given that the Florida election had been certified and Bush
was still the winner, the specific legal ground of the Florida Supreme
Court's first major opinion seemed like a question of interest only to
the technically minded because it was not relevant to the political
outcome. It plainly allowed the Florida Supreme Court to go back
and reach the same result as long as it clarified that its reasoning was
23

Ringel, supra note 85.

124 Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 121 S. Ct. 471

(2000) (No. 00-836), 2000 U,L 1763666, at *66-*68. Justice Scalia asked Gore counsel
Laurence Tribe to indicate what in the record showed that the Florida Legislature
"affirmatively invited the Florida Supreme Court" to enter election litigation and to
"interpose" the Florida Constitution. These questions paved the way for the xiew
expressed in the per curiam opinion that the proper way to conceive of the law in this
area was as a constitutional delegation to the state legislature to pass a law with quasifederal status, practically immune from state court construction in light of state
constitutional law. Id.
125 See PalmBeach County CanvassingBd., 121 S. Ct.
at 473-74 (per curiam).
126
127

Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
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based firmly on the intent of the Florida Legislature and careful
readings of the narrowly relevant federal law. And it seemed clearly to
direct the Florida Supreme Court not to go beyond the statute to the
Florida Constitution in working out what remedies might be granted.
In the results-driven atmosphere of the election challenges, the U.S.
Supreme Court's first decision in the election battle apparently
changed very little-it was more like a technical whimper than a
substantive bang.
C. Law's Flaws and the ContestPhase
The Gore team, however, was determined to press its challenge to
the vote tallies, and to do so on the basis of their original theory.
They believed that legal votes had been excluded because the
machines had failed to count the "undervotes," ballots that the
machine had registered as blank that a human eye might register as a
vote. The manual recounts had not been completed in Palm Beach or
Miami-Dade Counties in time to have the result added in to the
certified vote totals. So the Gore team filed a suit under the "contest"
provisions of the Florida law, alleging that "legal votes" had been
rejected from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties and urging their
inclusion in the certified totals.12 But the Gore team quickly learned
that there was a new set of statutory infelicities awaiting their
challenge under the contest provisions.
Statutorv Infelicity #4. In the "contest" phase under Florida election
law, a candidate who still believes that there are serious flaws in the
election tallies may challenge the certification of the election
results. ;'' Unlike in the protest phase when the complaint goes to the
I Complaint to Contest Election at 19-22, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla.
Cir.
Ct. Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/CV-00-2808a.pdf.
Specifically, the Gore team asked (1) that the 215 net votes for Gore that the Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board had identified but which came in too late for the
Secretary of State to count be added; (2) that the 3300 votes in Palm Beach County
that Democratic observers had determined were votes for Gore but which the County
Canxassing Board had not certified be further counted for Gore; (3) that the 168 net
votes for Gore identified in the partial recount in Miami-Dade county be added to the
totals, even though the whole county had not been recounted; (4) that Miami-Dade be
ordered to recount manually approximately 9000 "undervotes;" and (5) that the 51 net
votes for Bush that had been added by Nassau County be excluded since they reflected
the first election night totals rather than the required automatic recount totals that the
county had previously submitted.
The relevant law then shifted from FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 to FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 102.168. Under the Florida law as it stood before 1999, there was not a sharp
split between protest and contest phases. All challenges were taken up from the first
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county canvassing boards for their resolution, the contest phase sends
all complaints directly to the Florida courts, which are given very
broad latitude to investigate and fashion remedies to fix any
complaints they find to be valid.' 0 But this great judicial power does
not come with many critical constraints-the most crucial one in the
presidential electors context being whether there are any deadlines in
the process. The deadlines loom large for presidential electors
because these elections have a unique set of time constraints coming
from federal law that Florida law does not seem to have built into the
statutory provisions about contests.13'
According to federal law,
presidential electors are generally immune from later challenge in the
Congress when they have been duly selected pursuant to a procedure
put in place before the election and when they themselves are in place
six days before they have to cast their electoral votes.1:2 Further, they
are supposed to meet to cast their ballots on the "first Monday after
the second Wednesday in December," 33 which for this election year
was December 18. But the contest provisions of Florida law recognize
no such explicit deadlines by which the electors must be chosen. That
leaves the following questions:
What happens to the remedies
normally available in a contest period if the contest happens to occur
in races for presidential electors? Do candidates simply have fewer
remedies when time is short, or are there expedited procedures
available in such cases? Can expedited procedures cut certain corners
in order to obey the calendar? If so, which corners can the), cut? Or

moment by courts. Under the revisions of 1999, the election challenges were split into
two phases, where the first phase was to be handled by county canvassing boards and
the second phase was to go to the courts for most elections, including the election of
presidential electors.
130 "The circuitjudge to whom the contest is presented may fashion such orders as
he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is
investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to
provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances."
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001).
131Florida law does recognize some special rules for presidential electors, see id.
§§ 103.011-.71 (West 1982 & West Supp. 2001), but these are rules about how electors
are selected for the ballot and how missing electors shall be replaced, how write-in
candidates for president can be recognized, and such. There is no attempt to
reconcile the provisions for presidential electors in Chapter 103 with the protest and
contest provisions for challenging vote counts in Chapter 102.
1323 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
133Id. § 7 (1994). Florida law recognizes this in FLX. STAT. ANN. § 103.051
(West
1982) ("The presidential electors shall, at noon on the day which is directed by
Congress, meet at Tallahassee and perform the duties required of them by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.").
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can state law remedies affect the federal deadlines in the way that they
have already affected the state deadlines? Which federal deadlines are
crucial for state law?
Statutory hIfelicity #5. If a judge decides that a contest identifies a
legitimate problem, then under section 102.168(8) of the Florida
Statutes Annotated, the judge can "provide any relief appropriate
under such circumstances. " ' There is no further guidance to the
judge. So, how is ajudge to proceed if she believes that a violation of
election law has occurred? If, for example, some votes haven't been
counted, shall they be counted? All of them? Only where they were
challenged, or across the state? By whom and with what standards?
Or if, for example, some votes have been counted, but inconsistently
under the decisions of the canvassing boards in the protest phase,
what then? Or if some "legal votes" have been located, but the canvass
within a county wasn't finished? Or if there is good reason to believe
that the same problems occurred in other counties where a recount
did not occur, then what? And what is a "legal vote" anyway? !'' The
statute provides no standards, no answers, no guidance. It is, in short,
hard to construe strictly.
D. PlayingOut the Contest Phase
The first problem that the Gore team encountered in the contest
phase was the mess), problem of facts. Judicial remedies take time, in
no small part because judges must have facts, and facts require trials.
Though an evidentiary hearing was expedited, it didn't take place
until December 2-3, 2000. The hearing was short because the Gore
team truncated its testimony to just two witnesses in order to speed
the process along, and the Bush team, while clearly ready to go on a
great deal longer, was pushed by Leon County Circuit Judge N.
Sanders Sauls to limit itself to just a handful of witnesses. If the case
really rested heavily on its facts, then the Democratic plaintiffs were in
trouble because they simply didn't present much of the evidence that
would have allowed them to win on the facts. But the Gore team
obviously decided that their strong suit was legal interpretation rather
than factual proof, so a complete trial was one of the comers that they
were willing to cut. In the end, however, Judge Sauls's opinion went

FL. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001).
The Florida statute allows a challenge on the basis of "rejection of a number of
legal xotes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election." Id.
§ 102.168(3) (c). But the statute does not define "legal vote."
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against the Gore team on every particular, finding that the proof it
presented did not meet its legal burden, and so the court would not
even proceed to the validity of its legal arguments about how the
statute ought to be interpreted. Not a single one of its arguments met
with success.136
The Gore team appealed again on an expedited basis to the
Florida Supreme Court, which on December 8, 2000 came down with
a four-to-three judgment that went largely for Gore. 7 The majority
per curiam opinion agreed that the additional net votes for Gore from
the complete recount results in Palm Beach County and the
additional net votes for Gore that resulted from the partial recount in
Miami-Dade County should both be added to the state certification,
since they were legal votes that had been excluded from the
certification. 8 Most significantly, however, the Florida Supreme
Court's majority thought legal votes might well be found in any of the
undercounted votes across the state, not just in the places that the
Gore team had hand-picked. The majority wrote:
[I]t is absolutely essential in this proceeding and to any final decision,
that a manual recount be conducted for all legal votes in this State, not
only in Miami-Dade County, but in all Florida counties where there was
an undervote,
and, hence a concern that not every citizen's vote was
39
counted.

The court ordered a statewide manual recount but, though the
Gore team had asked repeatedly for a more definite standard to be
used in counting the votes as this manual counting continued, 4 " the
136Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/CV-00-2808-10.pdf; see also Transcript of Judge
Sauls's Order, Gore v. Harris, available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/002431_transcript.pdf.
137Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
1'8 Id. at 1248.
139 Id. at 1253.
14 Brief for Appellants, or in the Alternative, Petition for Writ of
Mandamus or
Other Writs at 32-34, Gore v. Harris (No. SC00-2431), available at http://
election2000.stanford.edu/00-2431iniGore.pdf. The Gore team also emphasized this
point in oral argument. Before the Florida Supreme Court on November 20, 2000,
David Boies urged, "this court needs to act expeditiously to set the standard." Asked
where the standard would be found, Boies said, "I think you find it partly in Florida
law, but I think you can also find it from the laws of other states that have dealt with
these very same questions .... I think it is important to the integrity of the process. I
think if you had very wide variations you could raise constitutional problems." CNN
Live Event: The FloridaRecount: FloridaSupreme Court Holds Hearingon ManualRecounts,
(CNN television broadcast, Nov. 20, 2000) (Transcript #00112005V54), available at
LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts. In oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court
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Florida Supreme Court hesitated in saying anything more specific
than to repeat the very general words of Florida's Legislature that "no
vote shall be ignored 'if there is a clear indication of the intent of the
voter' on the ballot, unless it is 'impossible to determine the elector's
choice."""
Among the three dissenters on the seven-member court, Chief
Justice Wells opposed the majority view most strongly. He said that
the majority should have deferred to the trial judge here, since he at
least had a defensible view of the pre-existing law, while the majority's
view was novel.'2 Chief Justice Wells argued that undertaking a
statewide recount of the undervotes neglected the potential legal
votes that could be found in those ballots that had two candidates
marked for president (the "overvotes") 43 and also that the court failed
to establish uniform procedure and standards that would allow all
legal votes to be equally recognized. 44 In obvious frustration with the
situation, ChiefJustice Wells noted that the various questions posed by
the 2000 presidential election in the State of Florida could not be
solved "with an election code which any objective, frank analysis must
conclude never contemplated this circumstance."14 5 But Chief Justice
Wells, together with Justices Harding and Shaw, who dissented
separately, all concluded that, whatever the right answer was under
Florida law, it was too late to find it out with the care that the process
desened. The December 12 "safe harbor" date for having electors in
place in order to insulate them from congressional challenges was fast
upon everyone by the time this case was decided on December 8. In
the conclusion to his dissenting opinion which argued that there was a
wrong but no remedy because of the looming deadlines, Justice
Harding quoted football coach Vince Lombardi
as saying, "We didn't
'' 4 6
lose the game, wejust ran out of time.

1

The contest period, now seen as radically shortened by the Florida

on December 11, David Boies argued, "I think there must be a uniform standard. I
think there isa uniform standard. The question is whether that standard is too
general or not. The standard is whether the intent of the voter is reflected by the
ballot." CAN Live Event: U.S. Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Bush Challenge of Florida
lwrunt (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 11, 2000) (Transcript #00121101V00).
M Gore v.Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1254 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5)-(6)
(West Supp. 2001)).

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
1269 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
1269-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
1273 (HardingJ, dissenting).
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Supreme Court's first decision extending the certification deadline,
had already nearly run the clock. But in a burst of energy under the
direction of Leon County Circuit Judge Terry Lewis, the manual
recounts started statewide that evening, with the idea that they would
all be finished by Sunday, December 10, leaving time for legal
challenges to be made before the December 12 "safe harbor" date.
But corners had to be cut. After a few tries at getting a fast but fair
procedure in place by going back to the county canvassing boards and
whatever warm bodies they could find to do the counts, Judge Lewis
changed the plan. He ultimately decided that county-level judges
statewide would be responsible for the count and would in fact do it
themselves, allowing no time for individual challenges to particular
ballots until the count was done. And although it would have surely
been helpful to have a more specific standard, especially for the
punch-card ballots where there had already been much conflict over
how many perforated comers the "chad" had to dislodge before the
ballot could count as a vote, the "intent of the voter" standard
mentioned in the statute was given as the only guidance to the
counters. This failure to provide a more specific standard was in all
probability a result of the Florida Supreme Court's reluctance to go
beyond the literal words of the Florida election law after what they
had just been instructed to do by the U.S. Supreme Court. At this
point, the primary goal was the most accuracy that could be mustered
consistent with the speed necessary to get the count done, and all
within the four comers of the statute under the most conservative
interpretation of the requisite timeline.
On December 9, upon urgent petition from the Bush team
seeking to halt the statewide manual recount, the Supreme Court
responded with an unusual stay order. Not only was the stay granted,
and the Florida Supreme Court's order on manual recounts
suspended, but the stay application was treated as a petition for a writ
of certiorari which the Supreme Court immediately granted, with
briefs to be filed the next day and oral argument to be heard the day
after that. Moreover, this was a stay decision with opinions. Justice
Stevens, along with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented
publicly from granting the stay on the grounds that no irreparable
harm to the petitioner had been demonstrated from allowing the
count to continue. 147 But Justice Scalia, concurring in the stay, noted
that the order "suggests that a majority of the Court... believe that

147 Bush

v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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the petitioner has a substantial probability of success"""' and that the
stay was necessary because the continued count would "threaten
irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the country, by casting a cloud
upon what he [the petitioner] claims to be the legitimacy of his
election."'""
In Florida, the vote count halted. The Florida Legislature,
pursuing another strategy, continued its special session, determined
to vote its own slate of electors for George W. Bush to cover itself in
the event that the courts pushed the election into the Gore column.5"
Briefs for the Supreme Court were written in great haste, without
much response time for the briefs to focus clearly on making and
rebutting arguments on the same points. Oral argument occurred on
the morning of December 11 when the ink was barely dry on the
briefs. And then there was what seemed like a long silence as the U.S.
Supreme Court worked out what to do.'5'
A bitterly divided Supreme Court issued its final five-to-four
judgment in the matter at 10 p.m. on the evening of December 12,
the day on which Florida's electors would have to be certified in order
to achieve immunity from challenge when the electors presented their
votes to the Congress. A per curiam opinion called a halt to the
election but did not say so in so many words. Instead, the opinion
announced a series of conclusions that, taken together, were quite
surprising: (1) "The individual citizen has no federal constitutional
right to vote for electors for President of the United States unless and
until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to
Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
1, David Firestone, Contesting the Vote: The Overview; 11ith Court Set To Hear Appea4
Ltgi4ators Move on Electors, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2000, at Al; seeJo Becker & Thomas B.
Edall, Ltgilature Ready To Support Bush, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al. In the
interest of lull disclosure, I should mention that I was called as one of the
"constitutional experts" to testify before a committee of the Florida House of
Reprecsentathes on behalf of the Democratic position that it was premature at best to
declare that the election had produced no victor under 3 U.S.C. § 2. Also, I argued
that A-ticle II, Section 1, clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution required that all electors be
chosen on the same day, which a legislative appointment subsequent to election day
would violate.
)'It The silence xws only long given the specific context. Ordinarily, of course, the
Supreme Court does not issue opinions the day after oral argument. But everyone
here knew the clock was ticking and, in particular, knew that the safe harbor date of
December 12 was, if not a hard deadline, at least a significant point of no return. As
the clock ran almost to the end of the safe harbor period, a tense national media kept
watch outside the Court and gave minute-by-minute reports on when the decision
would come down.
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implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College."'"
(2) Such a right, if granted by the state legislature, is fundamental,
unless the legislature decides to take it back, which it can do at any
time, 153 making this a highly unusual fundamental right. (3) The right
to vote for electors, if granted by a state legislature, rises to an
important enough level to require the application of equal protection
standards.TM (4) The Florida Supreme Court's order of a statewide
manual recount of undervotes failed the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection test because it did not include the recount of
overvotes, set up a specific standard for determining intent in
undervoted punch ballots, specify who should do the recounts,
provide a timely manner for objecting to decisions made while the
recount was going on, or in general provide assurance that
"rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied." 5 To fix this problem, the per curiam opinion
stated:
[I] t is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with
the requirements of equal protection and due process without
substantial additional work. It would require not only the adoption
(after opportunity for argument) of adequate statewide standards for
determining what is a legal vote, and practicable procedures to
implement them, but also orderly judicial review of any disputed matters
that might arise.... Use of the equipment [to screen out undervotes or
overvotes so that they might be separately counted] ... and any new
software developed for it, would have to be evaluated for accuracy by the
Secretary of State .... 56
And, according to the U.S. Supreme Court's majority, the
Supreme Court of Florida had said that the legislature intended to
have the electors in place by December 12.'5' Since that day had
152

Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 529 (2000) (per curiam).

153Id. at 529.

154Id. at 530.
155Id. at 532.

Id. at 532-33.
it was clear that the December 12 date had appeared frequently in the
discussions of deadlines from the time of the first protest action and that all parties
had accepted that the December 12 date was significant, the Florida Supreme Court
had never literally said that it felt bound by a legislative wish to meet the deadline, and
the statute made no specific attempt to reconcile the contest provisions with the
deadlines for selecting presidential electors. Perhaps the strongest evidence of
"legislative wish" in the record before the Supreme Court at the time they decided
Bush v. Gorewas the amicus brief filed on behalf of the Florida Legislature by Harvard
Law professors Charles Fried and Einer Elhauge and attorney Roger Magnuson. This
brief asserted that the present legislature did in fact wish that the election contest be
156

157While
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arrived and since the onerous requirements needed to ensure a fair
recount could not possibly be met in the two hours left before the
deadline elapsed, any recount would, of necessity, be unconstitutional."
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme
Court and remanded the case, but of course there was nothing left for
the Florida Supreme Court to do within the deadline that the U.S.
Supreme Court insisted was the one that the Florida Legislature
wanted.
Over four vigorous dissents, the Supreme Court's bare majority
called a halt to the election. Gore's challenge had run out of time
because a recount could not be conducted under the sort of uniform
standards that the Court, for the first time on December 12, had
announced. The Florida statute itself didn't anticipate these issuesthat there would be a need for statewide challenges and statewide
standards that would meet federal equal protection requirements.
The Florida statute also said nothing about a legislative preference to
settle electors by December 12; it took no note of the special timing
for selecting presidential electors at all in settling contests. For the
U.S. Supreme Court decision to be followed, there would have to be a

brought to a close in order for the state to take advantage of the safe harbor
provisions. See Brief of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate as
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party and Seeking Reversal at 18, Bush v. Gore,
121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. SCOO-949), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/
floridahousel.pdf ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court majority opinion would vitiate
Florida's safe harbor under 3 U.S.C. § 5 because it requires a manual recount that
cannot be fairly completed and finally adjudicated before midnight December 11 [sic].
This not only deviates from the Florida Legislature's wishes, but from the Florida
Supreme Court's own prior opinion, which stated that manual recounts should not be
counted if they would be 'submitted so late that their inclusion will [... ] preclude
Florida's voters from participating fully in the federal electoral process.'" (quoting
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239 (Fla. 2000))). At
least some justices of the Florida Supreme Court did not believe that they had
committed their court to that date, nor had the Florida statute. Justice Shaw,
concurring in the Florida Supreme Court's decision wrapping up the election cases,
noted "[Iln my opinion, December 12 w~as not a 'drop-dead' date under Florida law.
In fact, I question whether any date prior to January 6 is a drop-dead date under the
Florida election scheme." Gore v. Harris, 770 So. 2d 524, 529 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J.,
concurring). Justice Pariente, quoting Justice Ginsburg's dissent noting that the
December 12 date lacked the significance that the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore had
assigned to it, commented that "[tihe time limits Congress enacted for resolving
contests in Presidential elections were established in a far different time," and
suggested that "perhaps the time has come for Congress to explore whether, in the
rare case of a post-election presidential controversy, a thirty-five day time limit for a
final resolution of a presidential contest is realistic or reasonable." Id. at 530 (Pariente,
J., concurring.)
J-, Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 528.
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definition of a legal vote, and agreements about how to interpret
undervotes and overvotes, none of which the statute defined with any
precision. If new standards for Election 2000 were developed after
opportunity for argument, as the Supreme Court suggested, then the
creation of such standards would itself void the protections provided
by 3 U.S.C. § 5 because a state may not take advantage of the safe
harbor if its law has been changed since election day.
That leaves us with the simple question at the end of it all: What
was the election law in Florida that applied to the 2000 election? Or,
for that matter, what was the operative law in the election nationwide
through which George W. Bush became President of the United
States? In a rule-of-law state, we should be able to tell. But can we?

III. RULE-OF-JAW ISSUES IN THE FLORIDA ELECTION
The U.S. Supreme Court majority in the story of the 2000 election
seems to have taken its inspiration from the Knights Who Say NI! in
the Monty Python version of the Arthurian legend. Dressed in dark
uniforms and towering above the petitioners who came before them,
the Justices of the Supreme Court possessed the magic words that,
when shouted in chorus, caused those who needed their permission to
proceed to cower before them. For it was by pronouncing the magic
words that the Supreme Court Justices could cause the most selfconfident pretender to the throne to slink away. And, as in the
standard fairytale, the Court could set a challenge for the pretender to
the throne who, if he met the challenge, must be allowed to get what
he sought. The majority's reading of the fairytale requirements,
however, follows Pythonesque conventions rather than the standard
ones, and it deviates substantially from what the emerging
comparative constitutional standard for rule of law would require.
Between Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (the protest
phase case) and Bush v. Gore (the contest phase case), the Supreme
Court turned itself from the Knights Who Say NI! into the Knights
Who Go Neeeow... wum... ping!, no longer "contractually bound"
to be satisfied by a litigant who met the challenges that were set
originally and who was therefore looking to pass. Transforming itself
into the Knights Who Go Neeeow ...wom... ping!, the Supreme
Court had other ideas. In its new guise, instead of being satisfied by a
shrubbery brought before it designed according to their initial
request (a solution crafted under a literal reading of the Florida
statute), the majority insisted on a new shrubbery with a totally
different design (federal constitutional equal protection analysis
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rather than the literal wording of the Florida statute set the standard).
New magic words were necessary to pass through this part of the dark
forest of the law, except that the Knights had obviously tired of the
game and so simply declared it over.
What is wrong with this, on a rule-of-law account? A great deal,
but let me concentrate on two things in particular:
(1) The Whipsawing Problem: There was an apparent shift in the
legal frameworks that were found to be important as one case
followed another, leading to a sense that the applicable law was not
stable and making it very difficult for anyone to orient their conduct
in light of the law either before, during, or after the sequence of
litigation.
(2) The Impossibility Problem: There was, in the per curiam
opinion in Bush v. Gore, an announcement of two crucial legal
conclusions-that an equal protection test applied to court-ordered
vote-counting procedures and that 3 U.S.C. § 5 combined with a
"legislative wish" required that recounts not be extended past the
December 12 "safe harbor" date. But these two conclusions worked at
cross-purposes. Meeting one required violating the other, and vice
versa. With this logic, there was simply no place left to stand to claim
a remedy that the law seemed to allow and perhaps even to require.
The election was declared over as it stood at the moment the Court
issued its decision, and no state has ascertained whether the results as
they stood on the evening of December 12, 2000 met the equal
protection standards the court laid down.
From all of this, we might legitimately wonder whether the United
States in fact decided its most recent presidential election according
to any coherent law at all.
A. The WhqipsawingProblem

It is an often-praised feature of American courts that they operate
in an incremental and partial way, that they take matters on a case-bycase basis, that they consider only arguments put forward by the
parties, and that they decide issues only insofar as they have to, limited
by the facts of each case.'' Law stays in its modest and limited place
by virtue of the fact thatjudges are supposed to be humble about their
ambitions to set the world to rights in their decisions.
The

S.

,

,

CASS SUNSTEIN,

ONE GSE AT A TIME (1999)

(identifying and

defending "minimalism" as a distinctive form ofjudicial decisionmaking).
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incremental common law brings together ideas over time into the
seamless web of the law, so the story goes, and the coherence of law is
ensured by the fact that in its many tiny stitches, American law
produces a needlepoint of order. Of course, we can all think of areas
of law in which, over time, many small decisions led over time to very
substantial changes. Common law systems are not static, and the
accretion of small adjustments (punctuated by some fewer, larger
ones) creates a law that is flexible and adaptable to changing times.
Or at least those features that lead to incremental yet significant
change are portrayed as the great strengths of the common law.""
But there are occasions when American incrementalism makes a
hash of the rule of law, and Election 2000 was one of those times.
There were so many different lawsuits, raising very similar problems in
quite different ways, that the American court system was overwhelmed.
Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of lawyers wrote briefs to deal with the
narrowly drawn legal issues before them in each particular challenge
at each particular phase of the process (as they are, in a common law
system, supposed to do), and courts wrote decisions similarly, dealing
at a minimum with what they had to, leaving to the future any
question they could. The problem was that the future was the next
day, or the day after that, and so the press of cases that might have
caused the law to change gradually over time in the usual common
law manner caused the election law of Florida to change from day to
day in a way that tossed the candidates and their supporters up and
down from elation to depression, from legal victory to legal defeat.
All of these incrementalist decisions taken together produced an
incoherent patchwork of successful arguments, and yet what was at
stake was a single election whose outcome needed to be known and
needed to be understood as the application of a single set of rules.
Some general principles were needed to resolve like cases alike (and
even to determine which cases were alike) because the cases were
going to be decided close enough to each other in time that they
needed to be imagined together and because they were going to be
aggregated into a single result for the same election. The problem
was aggravated by the drafting problems in the Florida statute, so
courts had to try to announce the governing principles as they went
along and as one new statutory infelicity was discovered after another.
The time pressures, the extremely high stakes, and the extraordinary
I

I would like to thank Seth Kreimer for focusing my attention on
the way in

which traditional methods of common law judging are implicated in this set of
problems.
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number of cases brought to challenge various parts of Florida's
election framework put extraordinary pressure on incrementalism. As
a result, instead of seeing the often-touted virtues of the case method,
what we saw instead was whipsawing.
In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the U.S. Supreme
Court's per curiam opinion laid out a framework that the Florida
Supreme Court was to follow in thinking about the presidential
elector cases in general, and presumably not just in the one before it
in the protest phase. As the per curiam decision emphasized, the U.S.
Constitution in Article II, Section 1, clause 2 gave the power to
detenine the manner of choosing electors to the state legislature.
The state legislature's word was, therefore, to be given special
deference in the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court left the strong hint
that the Florida Supreme Court should not rely on its own state
constitution or any judicial creativity to help it sort out what the state
election statute meant. To be safe from further reversals, the Florida
Supreme Court could have reasonably thought that strict and literal
interpretation of the Florida law was required since the federal
constitutional procedures for choosing presidential electors built in a
special role for the state legislature, whose views of the matter must
therefore take precedence. The Supreme Court seemed to say that
the only constraints that could be imposed on the state legislature also
had to come from federal law, and it chose to highlight Congress's
role in setting the timing for selecting electors.' 6' The U.S. Supreme
Court seemed to warn the Florida Supreme Court that if it went too
far in constructing the law through interpreting the statute creatively,
then this might by itself pose constitutional problems because the
lawmaking power in this area was clearly given to the state legislature
without necessarily presupposing any role for state courts.
In that first decision, the U.S. Supreme Court did not mention
any other constitutional requirements that would further constrain
interpretation of this law. But the equal protection theory had been
put on the table in the federal litigation that George W. Bush had
already brought (and lost) in federal court. Bush had sought review
by the Supreme Court of his consistent defeats on this issue in federal
court at the same time that he sought review of the Florida Supreme
Court's protest phase decision. But according to long-standing
convention and our incremental practices, we were not supposed to
be able to conclude anything from the Supreme Court's denial of
1"4U.S, CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.4.
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certiorari in the federal case or from the refusal of the Supreme Court
to entertain a question that had not been fully addressed below. Still,
in the heated context of the election challenges, the denial of
certiorari on the equal protection claim and the limitation of
questions to the Article II and 3 U.S.C. § 5 points seemed to imply that
there was no substantial equal protection claim to be argued. If time
was of the essence here (and of course, the U.S. Supreme Court's later
decision in Bush v. Gore indicated that time was the only essence), then
why put off that question unless it wasn't part of resolving Election
2000? Of course, the Court put it off because it wasn't part of the
incremental challenge before it from the Florida Supreme Court's
protest phase case.
The case that came back to the U.S. Supreme Court in the contest
phase had different parties162 and was brought under a different part
of Florida law.' 63 But it involved the same set of demands in the sane
ongoing dispute, and one would expect that it would be decided
according to the same basic set of constitutional principles already
identified as central for choosing presidential electors. Gore still
wanted a manual recount that would find legal votes among the
Florida undervotes in particular and Bush didn't want the recount to
occur. The relevant law had been staked out as the Florida election
law (taken in isolation from other Florida law), the U.S. Constitution's
Article II, Section 1 provision for selecting presidential electors, and
its associated federal law.'" In the second round of challenges under
the contest phase of the Florida statute, Gore had, as he had in the
first round, followed what the statute appeared literally to require: He
had filed in the appropriate state court a legal challenge setting out
the specific ballots that he wanted to challenge (even the U.S.
Supreme Court did not question that). 6 And the Florida Supreme
162

It was now Gore directly whom Bush sought to halt, not the count) canvassing

boards whom Gore had called into service. Throughout the Election 2000 litigation, it
was often unclear whether the correct parties were before the court. Were the
candidates or the voters or perhaps even the electors the proper plaintiffs? Were the
county canvassing boards the proper defendants throughout? This awaits closer
procedural analysis. I am grateful to Ed Hartnett for exploring these issues with me.
10 Bush v. Gore was about a challenge under section 102.168 of Florida election
law, whereas Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard featured a challenge under
section 102.166.
164 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
165As David Boies pointed out in oral argument before the Florida Supreme
Court, previous Florida cases had allowed a few specific ballots to be challenged in
particular elections and did not seem to require that all of the votes from a whole
precinct, district or state be counted. "'This is a situation in which we have identified
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Court on appeal had settled on a form of remedy that was hard to
challenge, since the statute plainly gave the court broad equitable
powers to fix any wrong they found. But the second time Al Gore
returned to the Supreme Court, the Knights Who Formerly Said "NI!"
(where "NI!" highlighted the literal meaning of the statute and
deference to the legislature, which has constitutionally granted power
in the matter of presidential electors) now said "Neeeow.... wurm...
ping!" (where the new magic words signified that equal protection
and fundamental fairness were the crucial constitutional guiding
principles, even if that meant literally ignoring the state statute to
which the Florida Supreme Court had been previously instructed to
accord such special deference).
Perhaps the Supreme Court was right about the standards the
second time around. Perhaps the right to vote for presidential
electors does need more constitutional protection to ensure the
fundamental fairness of the counting procedures and the equality of
treatment of all of the votes. Those seem like quite sensible principles
for running federal elections. In the abstract, by my lights at least,
they are far more sensible than the decentralized and arbitrarily
unequal procedures we now have in place, even though the current
decentralized structure of federal elections was clearly an intentional
part of the original constitutional design. 66 But if that was going to be
the most important rule that all had to play by, why did the Supreme
Court not say so in its first opinion on the matter, when the State of
Florida had already clearly launched into a set of recounts that
allowed different standards to be used in different counties? If Al
Gore had wanted to play by the rules to see whether he in fact got
more votes in the State of Florida than George W. Bush, he would, at a
minimum, need to know what rules he was playing by.
The rules that were determined to be the operative rules in play
by the end of the process were not announced in advance. Instead,
the U.S. Supreme Court's first opportunity to lay out an election
framework in Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard resulted in a
decision that made it affirmatively more difficult for the Florida
Supreme Court to guess at what the right rules would eventually be
deemed to be. The Florida Supreme Court, in its November 21
specific Notes.'" Arguments Before the FloridaSupreme Court on the PresidentialRecount, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A34 (quoting David Boies).
J,, See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATES INTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF

1787, at 401-05 (W.W. Norton &Co. 1987) (1840); see also U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 2
(Netting forth the provisions regarding the selection of presidential electors).
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decision in Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard v. Harris,had laid out
one workable method of statutory construction, using garden variety
methods of statutory construction along with the Florida Constitution
to figure out a way to cope with the gaps and contradictions in state
law. But the U.S. Supreme Court apparently thought that the Florida
Supreme Court had insufficiently recognized the federal
constitutional and statutory issues here and suggested that the Florida
court rethink its reasoning, keeping these suggestions in mind.
Had the Florida Supreme Court understood that they should
apply federal constitutional equal protection or due process principles
in order to fill in the missing spaces in the defective Florida statute,
they probably would have eagerly complied. Since the Florida statute
gave the court broad powers to fashion remedies in the contest phase,
the Florida justices could have worked out a way within Florida's
existing election law to count the ballots with uniform1 7 statewide
'6
standards derived from a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
But the U.S. Supreme Court's first decision positively disabled the
Florida Supreme Court from figuring out what the U.S. Supreme
Court would deem to be the right solution in the end. By appearing
to elevate the state election statute to quasi-federal status-since the
state legislature had been given an extraordinary power by the U.S.
Constitution in this one matter-the U.S. Supreme Court gave a
warning to the Florida Supreme Court that it would not look kindly
on attempts to improvise more detailed requirements than the state
statute already provided. So, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably
took its task to be giving meaning, so far as possible, to the flawed
statute itself, not reading in more precise standards to be used in the
vote counting that the legislature had not already and literally put
there. The Florida Supreme Court therefore declined to give further
specification to the "intent of the voter" standard or to set out a
standardized procedure for ensuring that different count), counters
used similar objective tests. Given the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, filling in the blanks in Florida's
gap-filled election law with constitutional principles seemed to be

167 The

three dissenters from the Florida Supreme Court's majority opinion in the

contest action did note that there were problems with the absence of standards and
procedures in the recount, in addition to noting that time was too short to conduct the
recounts. But, as former dissenter Shaw said in his concurring opinion in the
December 22, 2000judgment bringing the case to a final halt, he had dissented only
from the standardless recounts, not from the general view that all votes should be
counted, even if it took longer than the December 12 date.

20011

1423

THE 2000 ELECTION AAD THE RULE OFLAW

courting a reversal.
So it was a particularly cruel blow when the U.S. Supreme Court's
per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore arguably implied that the Florida
statute was itself unconstitutionally vague because it failed to
recognize and detail methods for providing "at least some assurance
that the rudimentary requirements of equal protection and
fundamental fairness are satisfied." '" As Florida Supreme Court
Justice Pariente's wistful yet defiant concurrence suggested in the final
Florida Supreme Court decision wrapping up the election:
[Tihe United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore has also
called into question the constitutionality of any statutory scheme that
does not have more specific standards for evaluating votes when
conducting manual recounts than the one currently codified by Florida
law, which is whether the intent of the voter can be ascertained.
However, before the 2000 presidential election, neither the Legislature
nor the Secretary of State had prescribed more explicit criteria to govern
the determination of the voter's intent-'1
As Pariente

further noted,

"Neither candidate

raised

the

constitutionality of Florida's election laws as an issue on appeal to this
Court. Instead, President Elect Bush chose to bring a separate
challenge to the constitutionality of section 102.166 in federal court
[where it was rejected]

.'"

Since neither of the parties, nor the U.S. Supreme Court itself
when it remanded Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard to the
Florida Supreme Court, put the federal constitutional equal
protection or due process claims squarely before the Florida Supreme
Court, the court could be forgiven for not considering a challenge not
raised under the usual American rules about incrementalism. Bush
had raised these questions in the federal courts while seeking an
injunction to halt the manual recounts, but neither the federal district

judge nor the Eleventh Circuit thought that there was merit in his

I- Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam). There is some ambiguity
abo iut how to read the opinion here. In its narrow reading, it seems to claim that equal
protection problems only arise when a court-ordered statewide recount is at issue. But
it i not clear how that would be distinguished on principle from the broader
reading-that equal protection issues arise whenever vote counting is done within a
state without a common set of standards to be used county to county and even
counting team to counting team.
"- Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 534 (2000) (Pariente, J., concurring)
(citation
and foomote omitted).
Id. at 524, n.25 (citation omitted).
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argument 7' and the Supreme Court, when initially asked to review the
equal protection and due process arguments, denied certiorari to
hear the appeal even as it granted certiorari to hear an appeal from
the Florida Supreme Court case in Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard
v. Harris.' It certainly seemed reasonable for the Florida Supreme
Court to believe that federal equal protection principles were not
even on the table as they considered this case and, given what else the
Supreme Court said, the justices of the Florida Supreme Court might
well have thought that it would be inadvisable to invoke a federal
equal protection or due process rationale to decide the next case that
came before them in the contest phase if they wanted to avoid
reversal.
If Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard and Bush v. Gore had
been separated by a few elections and not just by a few days, then the
move from one to the other might be more comprehensible in the
common-law scheme of things. As times change, Article II problems
can change into Fourteenth Amendment issues with new facts and
new sensibilities and due time to argue the matter. If several elections
had separated the two decisions, then new sets of litigants would have
had a chance to adjust to the first theory of elections; they would have
had a chance to critique this theory and come up with new arguments
to which their opponents, and a new court, could respond. But
because the two cases were separated by less than two weeks and the
theory of how to read an election statute with flaws was changed so
radically in so little time, the litigants (and the voters) could be
forgiven for feeling that the law had been pulled out from underneath
them.
It is this sort of "law abuse" that various post-horror constitutional
courts would recognize immediately as something that they
themselves should not do. Post-horror constitutional courts consider
that litigants and the broader audiences for court decisions should
not feel as though they are the subjects of legal experimentation, even
if it is possible that a theory of legal interpretation would give
Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla.) (denying a request for a
preliminary injunction to stop the recount), ajfd, 234 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 510 (2000).
172 On November 24, 2000, the U.S. Supreme
Court simultaneously granted
171

certiorari in Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000), and
refused certiorari in Siegel v. LePore, 121 S. Ct. 510 (2000). Although Bush also made
the equal protection and due process arguments in the petition for certiorari in Palm
Beach County, the Court did not engage those either, perhaps because those arguments
had not been presented fully below to the Florida Supreme Court.
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alternative readings equal plausibility de novo. Having chosen onethe Article II reading-the Court should have given up the possibility
of changing its mind so quickly to the Fourteenth Amendment theory,
not because the Fourteenth Amendment arguments are substantively
implausible, but because giving them conclusive weight at such a late
stage of the proceedings seemed even more than usual to be changing
the rules after the fact."- Alternatively, it would have been far better
for the Court to have dealt with both the Article II and the Fourteenth
Amendment issues at once when it had the chance in Palm Beach
Counly Canvassing Board, in order to give both Bush and Gore a
reasonable opportunity to try to work out their challenges under a
stable understanding of the relationship between federal
constitutional and state statutory election law.
The speed-up of constitutional evolution that occurred in the
election cases reveals a weakness in the American legal system. While
there is always a danger in the common law incrementalist method
that particular litigants will be unsettled, the danger increases a great
deal when events are changing so fast that a court is tempted to
update its view of the matter before the parties to a case have had a
The common law xiolation here may be that the Court came up with
two
different legal frameworks for analyzing the same set of facts. But a purist might note
that the protest and contest cases were not exactly the same. In the protest case, the
question before the U.S. Supreme Court wws whether the Florida Supreme Court had
impermissibly changed the election law or merely interpreted it. For that, Article II
proxided a reading of what the Florida Supreme Court's responsibility was in the area
of presidential electors. By the time the case came back in the protest phase, the U.S.
Supreme Court was faced with a court-ordered statewide recount under standards that
were xery general. The per curiam opinion tried to tailor a ruling to apply only to the
situation of a statewide manual recount ordered by a court. But the problem of
standards in counting the %otehad been there from the start, and the U.S. Supreme
Court's late adherence to an equal protection theory therefore appears to be merely
outcome-oriented. For this reason, the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore offends
less against rule-of-law principles because it does carry through the implications of the
Article I reasoning that was at the heart of Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard.
Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 533 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The per
curiam decision does not eien mention the Article II argument, perhaps because there
was another difference in the two cases. The protest phase case was raised under a
part of the statute that saw the county canvassing boards as the main bodies that could
proxide remedies while the contest phase explicitly lodged broad powers in courts to
remedy an) alleged wrong. Under those circumstances, where the statute explicitly
gie.. a broad equitable power to the courts, the Article II argument surely does not
work as well, as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy must have realized. Technically
speaking, then, the protest and contest phases raised different legal issues, but since
eier)one could see that this was the same election and the same issue about manual
recounts, the Court failed to pro-ide a generally understandable and coherent account
of the federal constitutional basis of presidential election law.
J;,
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chance to take on board the last set of changes. And while it is
disturbing that a common law system generally effects changes in
cases in which the litigants might not have fully foreseen what the law
is before the decision, it is doubly disturbing that the same set of
litigants should have this happen twice in two weeks, when the whole
legal framework for the election was rewritten and the litigants were
instructed to go back to square one. In this sequence of decisions, the
rule of law seems to have been one of the major losers.
B. Legal Impossibility
All of the participants involved in the Election 2000 challenges
knew they were working against a deadline. And while at first, all of
the parties wanted to wrap up all challenges by the December 12 "safe
harbor" date that would have given some protection to Florida's
electors against challenge before the Congress, the firmness of that
deadline came under closer scrutiny as it came closer in time. The
Gore team had argued all along that the December 12 date was an
instruction to Congress not to interfere with state processes for
selecting electors as long as the process was regulated by laws passed
before the election and all challenges under that law were wrapped up
by that date. According to the Gore team, the "safe harbor" provision
was not a mandatory instruction to the state, but instead an
instruction to the Congress about how to treat a state's electoral
votes.' 74 But the Bush team and the Florida Legislature argued that
December 12 was a drop-dead date that, if missed, jeopardized the
representation of Florida in the electoral college. In their view, 3
U.S.C. § 5 therefore imposed duties on the state to settle its electors by
that date. 75

174

Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr. and the Florida Democratic Party at 21-28,

Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (No. 00-836),
availableat http://election2000.stanford.edu/briefforrespondentsgore.pdf.
175 Brief of the Florida House of Representatives
and Florida Senate as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party and Seeking Reversal at 16, Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct.
525
(2000)
(No
00-949),
available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/
floridahousel.pdf ("The Florida Supreme Court has jeopardized Florida's
participation in the Electoral College in disregard of this Court's prior admonition,
clear legislative wishes, and the Florida Supreme Court's own prior decision."); Brief
for Petitioners at 35, Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at
http://elecdon2000.stanford.edu/bush949brief.pdf ("Reversal of the decision below is
essential to preserve the protections that Congress sought to confer upon the States
through § 5, to secure the certainty and finality of Florida's electoral process, and to
ensure that Florida's electoral votes are accorded proper consideration in Congress.").
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In the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gane, the December 12 "safe
harbor" suddenly turned into a blockaded port. The Supreme Court,
in effect, prohibited recount ships from exploring the waters beyond
the safe harbor, even though the Florida Legislature had nowhere put
into the law anything that indicated such a preference, and even
though the Florida Supreme Court, while clearly hurrying to try to
meet this date, had not indicated that it was a blockade date for them
either if there were important considerations of fairness at stake.
Other states had clearly gone beyond this date in the past and still had
their electors uncontroversially recognized far later in the process
than the "safe harbor" date of December 12 .
Suddenly, however,
the December 12 date became an absolute deadline preventing the
newly announced standards from being applied to the matter at hand.
This particular aspect of the Court's decision has few defenders
even among those who othenise broadly agree with what the Court
did in Bush v. Gore. But the deadline was critical to the result; in fact,
in large measure, the deadline was the result. The per curiam
opinion announced an ambitious set of guarantees that Florida law
had to ensure, and then said that time was up so that standards could
not be fornulated and applied in the case that provided the occasion
for the change in the law.
This combination of the ambitious new standards and the miserly
deadline created an impossibility problem. If the Gore team sought
to follow the guidelines for creating a uniform set of counting

17,Hawaii's slate of electors in 1960 was not picked until the eve of
the
Cobngressional vote counting, see GOP Expresses Rancor over Ruling; Lawmaker Threatens
To Challenge Eh'tors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at A33, and 3 U.S.C. § 15 seems to
contemplate that. As long as there is still only one slate of electors presented to the
:,ongress, it would take something extraordinary to fail to give deference to the state
on the matter. Only a majority vote in both houses of the Congress could reject a single
slate of electors coming from a state. Of course, Florida might well have gone on to
have tzo slates of electors, since the Florida Legislature was bent on ensuring that a
slate of electors go fornard for Bush regardless of the outcome of the court decisions
and subsequent vote-counting. But even then, there are procedures in 3 U.S.C. § 15
bor coping ith the congressional receipt of two competing slates of electors. The
Election 2000 problems, however bizarre they may have seemed, did have a clear
political remedy. That political remedy located the solution in the dynamics of the
neuw Congress, not in the Supreme Court. Given 3 U.S.C. § 15, there was absolutely no
reason fbr the Supreme Court to step in and stop the election. The law had not yet
run Jut. Both the Constitution in the Twelfth Amendment and federal law under 3
U.S.C. § 15 still defined what should happen next. It ,was left to Congress to decide, in
the end, whether the recount procedures produced an adequate result, which would
be determined in the Congress's judgment about whether to accept a particular slate
of electors. The Supreme Court's decision preempted this congressional function.
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standards, it would miss the deadline. If it sought to meet the
deadline, it could not create the standards. It was, at the time Bush v.
Gore came down, impossible for the Gore team to satisfy
simultaneously both legal requirements that the Court set out.
How can we think about what is wrong with this? Again, the ruleof-law jurisprudence of the post-horror constitutional courts provides
some guidance. Particularly in soviet-style legal systems, these sorts of
Catch 22 situations were not unusual. And it was precisely this sort of
experience that has led post-horror courts to be on the lookout for
impossibility situations in particular, using their powers to do the
opposite of what the U.S. Supreme Court did.
Rather than
announcing standards that create new impossibility problems,
constitutional courts typically use their powers ofjudicial review to say
that an interpretation of law creating such impossibilities is in itself a
violation of the rule of law. When law commands two contradictory
things, the rule of law requires that the contradiction be removed.
For a court to participate actively in the creation of such an
impossibility seems, in comparative perspective, quite astounding.
IV. SETTLING THE ELECTION WITHOUT SETTLING THE LAW
So, after all of this, what is wrong with the 2000 election? The
sequence of court decisions, and particularly the final decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, raises serious questions about the rule of law. ,77
The appearance and disappearance of legal standards throughout
the Election 2000 lawsuits was a clear sign of the law itself being used
as a vehicle of abuse. The Florida election statute was clearly
incomplete, and into the gaps jumped the political strategy of both
the Bush and Gore camps, as well as the politically motivated
discretion of public officials charged with important but incompletely
regulated functions under the law. Gore could challenge the vote
tallies precisely in the places where he was most likely to pick up votes
while ignoring counties that might have had more votes for Bush,
leading to the cynical view that Gore wanted not to count every vote,
but to count every Democratic vote. But it was, apparently, not only a
177My argument here is not that the U.S. Supreme Court should have
cited as
precedent cases from the Hungarian Constitutional Court or the Slovenian, Polish, or
German courts, though these other courts are far more likely to look to each other
than the U.S. Supreme Court is to look beyond its own jurisprudence. One of the
stabilizing aspects of the new constitutional jurisprudence is that constitutional courts
across Europe do tend to know, understand, and make use of each other's
jurisprudence.
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perfectly legal challenge under the statute as written but the only sort
of legal challenge envisioned in the law. Additionally, in the absence
of clear and specific standards for counting machine-punched votes,
Gore could argue for those standards most favorable to himself-and
whatever he argued would of course have been decried on the Bush
side, even if the standards Gore proposed were completely reasonable.
Of course, it wasn'tjust Gore who was using the law to fit his own
strategic purposes. Bush was able to use the legal ambiguity to litigate
and stall and run out the clock while tying the Gore team up in legal
knots. All the while, Bush was not taking steps available to him to fix
the errors that he decried. Though the Bush team branded the fourcounty manual recounts as selective and unfair because they would
leave legal votes for him uncounted elsewhere in the state, the power
to fix the selectivity by filing challenges in the other counties was
clearly in Bush's hand. But, of course, he did not want to use that
power because it might not have benefited him politically. What did
benefit Bush politically was dragging every legal challenge on every
point out as long as possible. The uncertainty of the law and the
repeated legal challenges that were necessary to sort out what the law
was clearly benefited the person who held the advantage of the status
quo.
Republican Katherine Harris, charged with supervising the
elections, had to make her decisions under a statute that omitted any
clear standards about what she might use as a legitimate basis for
rejecting late returns. On a cynical view, she took this as blanket
permission to reject anything that might operate against the candidate
she preferred. In addition, without clear standards for the county,
canvassing boards to use in determining whether and how to do a
manual recount of ballots, the various county canvassing boards could
use the legal ambiguity to justify whatever it was that they wanted to
do-count or not count, omit dimpled chads or not, as the case may
be.
Badly drafted statutes do more than make the situations they
regulate unclear; a statute as badly drafted as this one positively invites
abuse. If all parties can be easily seen to be following their own selfinterest to the point where the question "Who won the election?"
becomes impossible to answer without a reference to the candidate
whom one wanted to win, it is notjust the candidates' fault. The whole
reason for having law to guide election challenges is precisely to
provide a nonpartisan mechanism for resolving disagreements, and
the nonpartisan character of the law is assured primarily because the
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framework is settled before a particular dispute has arisen. But when
a statute fails this elementary test-fails to channel challenges in such
a way that they can be resolved according to standards that are known
to be in place before the election-then the rule-of-law justification
for following the law in the first place disappears. The Florida statute
did not make the election more predictable, orderly, and fair. In the
end, it prevented the predictable, orderly, and fair resolution of the
election. Election 2000 turned into a legal free-for-all, with the
various court challenges being used alternatively as harassment of the
opponent and as political theater.
Both George W. Bush and Al Gore could be forgiven for having
no idea about how the various court decisions would come out in
Election 2000, given the incrementalist nature of the claims and
responses from various courts. And Bush and Gore could be forgiven

for thinking that the end result depended more on the political
affiliations of the judges that heard the cases than it did on the law.
Part of what gripped the millions of us who were glued to our
televisions during those thirty-six days was precisely the sense of
unpredictability that resulted as one court ruled for Gore, and then
the next court, accepting very different legal arguments, ruled for
Bush. One of my colleagues compared the post-election court
decisions to the opening scenes of Raiders of the Lost Ark.1" Just when
Indiana Jones, the swashbuckling anthropologist-hero in that movie,
had escaped from one heart-stopping threat, another one came-and
then another and another to the point where the abnormal became
normal. The election made for great television. It made for very bad
law.
What we all saw during those thirty-six days was an American
example of law abuse as both parties got as good as they gave in the
self-interested attempt to make the most of a law that failed to
constrain them at nearly every crucial turn. Both the Bush and Gore
camps were whipsawed back and forth in state court, federal court, on
trial and at appeal, through stays and reversals, new remedies, and
new standards. Since the Florida election statute had a variety of
unfortunate gaps, politics appeared to plug the gaps, which should
have instead been plugged with principle. Both Al Gore and George
W. Bush were caught up in a no-win game of legal formality and "you
can't get there from here" arguments played with the highest stakes
imaginable. Trapped inside a bad statute which contained neither the
178 RAIDERS OFTHE LosrARK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1981).
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explicit language nor the conceptual resources to deal with the
situation that arose in the specific election, the candidates and the
voters apparently became dependent instead on the partisan political
preferences of thejudges. And the legal ambiguity gave judges plenty
of room to hang their own political preferences out on public display.
The rule-of-law principles revealed by a comparative constitutional
analysis promise a way out of this. When confronted with a statute full
of gaps and contradictions, a court should not try to pretend that the
statute is not a problem and should certainly not put more weight on
it than it can bear with literal interpretation. Instead, a court
committed to the rule of law needs to examine the principles that
animate the statute in light of the broader legal framework beyond
the specific statute. In addition, a court should consider as well the
expectations both of the litigants and also of the broader community
which will have to live with the decision that the court's intervention
ultimately produces. At a time like this, ajudge has the responsibility
to eschew a formalist approach to the statute in the name of the rule
of law. But a judge also has the responsibility to prevent her own
decisions from increasing the uncertainty and arbitrariness of the law.
Decisions that whipsaw the litigants back and forth and decisions that
require the impossible invite skepticism about courts.
In post-horror countries, where constitutional courts know fullwell how easy it is to slide into law abuse and are therefore constantly
on guard against it, it is hard to imagine that this set of decisions
would have been produced.17' The statute may have been severely
flawed, but the sequence of court decisions, and particularly the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, which kept changing the legal
frame, made matters worse.
The answer that should have emerged here was not difficult to
discern in light of constitutional norms that would have been
relatively easy to explain to a broad public. For one thing, the rights
at stake were not the rights of the candidates, but instead the rights of
the voters. And what is the substance of those rights? The substance
is quite close to what the per curiam decision in Bush v. Gore said it
was: the right to vote is a fundamental right that, precisely because it
is fundamental, is subject to equal protection principles. That sort of
7, One other crucial institutional difference, however, is that continental legal

s stems typically concentrate the power of judicial review in a single constitutional
court, while the American power of judicial review is theoretically available to any
court. The concentrated system ofjudicia review means that it is clear who bears the
responsibility for ensuring that the big picture of constitutional claims is in Niew.
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analysis could have produced an early constitutional framework along
the lines of "count all the votes, but count them equally." '"" Gore
would have gotten his request to count the votes, but Bush would have
gotten the guarantees that such a count would not be weighted in
favor of those voters from whom Gore thought he could extract the
most support. Such a principle, announced either by the Florida
Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court early on, would have gone
a long way toward settling the election by setting up a framework that
did not simply seem to pick a specific result. It would also have saved
the rule of law. "Count all of the votes using the same standard"
would have meant supplementing Florida's defective statute with
more stabilizing constitutional principles rather than construing the
statute literally and therefore compounding the uncertainty.
Ensuring equal protection would have kept voters' rights in view and
would not have allowed them to get lost in the unbridled discretion of
state officials (including not only the Secretary of State, but also the
canvassing boards) or in the self-serving strategies of both campaigns.
Such a decision would have, in the longer run, tied legality to
legitimacy, though it would have come at the expense of following the
statute literally. The whipsawing of the voters and the candidates, and
the television drama that showed endless shocking twists and turns,
should have been a sign that the election law itself was unstable
because it was capable of being filled with completely partisan
content. And a responsible court should have determined at the first
possible opportunity that a defective statute that affected the rights of
voters needed to be supplemented by the articulation of a
constitutional framework for resolving the election that did not seem
to be so nakedly choosing sides.
In the early days of recounting, no one knew how a statewide
recount would have turned out. It therefore would have been harder
to complain that a statewide recount would favor one candidate or
another precisely because the result was unclear. It also would have
been harder to complain that determining the election by a count of
the votes was somehow itself a partisan act. The longer things went
on, and the more time there was for a strategic analysis of what sorts

180 The Article II argument, if it were to play a role on this
analysis, would have to
accommodate the view that the federal Constitution, at least, could provide guidance
that would supplement the statutory framework even if state constitutional law could
not. From the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court's own involvement in the case was not
questioned by the Article II defenders, I would assume that even they would haxe to

acknowledge this.

20011

THE 2000 ELECTION AND THE RULE OFLA W143

1433

of counting rules in which sorts of counties benefited each candidate,
the less possible it became for any court to announce any standard
that would have been seen as reasonably nonpartisan. The more the
concrete result could be seen in the standard itself, the more the
standard seemed politicized.
In the end, what happened was the worst of all possible worlds.
Not only was the Florida statute not saved through literal
interpretation, but the whole election was finally decided according to
legal standards that remain quite unclear. By hanging onto the view
that the statute could and did provide all the answers until the last
minute, the U.S. Supreme Court ensured that the crucial contest in
Election 2000 was in practice decided according to no discernible law
at all.
The standards the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Bush v. Gore
not only could not guide Florida's recount because they came too late,
but they were not even used to revise Florida's existing certified vote
totals. Moreover, they were not used to guide any of the other states
whose results were part of the election totals nationwide and which
might have run afoul of the standards that the Court held were to be
retroactively applied to Election 2000. Given the great difficulties in
unscrambling the eggs that the certified vote total in Florida mixed
together, it might have made good sense for the U.S. Supreme Court
to announce that its decision in Bush v. Gore had a prospective effect
only. After all, it was the twenty-second hour-literally-by the time
the Court made its pronouncement, and the Court itself set ground
rules that nullified the application of its own decision standards to any
ongoing Florida recount effort in Election 2000. Still, the U.S.
Supreme Court seemed bent on retroactive application.
In practice, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore
applied neither retroactively nor prospectively. It simply stopped
everything where it was on the night of December 12. No more
official vote counting occurred after that date; the election results in
place on that night were eerily preserved, rather like the ruins of
Pompeii after the volcano. America has since inaugurated a new
president, a president who was deemed to have won the votes he
needed in the Electoral College even though he did not win the
popular vote nationwkide.'
But by how many votes, exactly, did

) According to the CNN News Website, Gore leads in the popular tally by some
539,947 votes. Cable News Network, Election 2000 Archive, at http://wv.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2000.
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George W. Bush win his slate of electors in Florida? That turns out to
be a legally embarrassing question to ask.
Did he win by the 1,784-vote margin of election night? Or by the
300-vote margin resulting from the automatic recount? Did he win by
the 930 votes that he appeared to have won after the absentee ballots
were counted? Or did he win by the 537-vote count of the official
certification? Is there some other number that better accounts for the
results? Or-and of course the question lingers--did he really win at
all?' 82 If the votes had been recounted in Florida under the sorts of
procedures that the U.S. Supreme Court outlined as constitutionally
required, do we know for sure that George W. Bush would have won
Florida's electoral votes? And is it constitutionally permissible to
count any other number, given the rationale in the per curiam
opinion? Were we really in such a rush to find out that we didn't
really care so much about whether we got the answer right?
The U.S. Supreme Court, while it did not in fact explicitly rule

that the Florida statute was unconstitutional, certainly strongly
implied that the statute was constitutionally deficient. If Florida
election law does have the constitutional infirmities that the Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore pointed to, and if the retroactive logic of Bush
v. Gore requires that those infirmities be fixed for Election 2000, then
that leaves open the question ofjust what Florida election law is and
was for Election 2000.
The statute is arguably constitutionally defective in many ways:
First, it is arguably defective because of Statutory Infelicity #1, where
the statute apparently allows the Secretary of State to throw out late
returns, even though there are no standards in the law for the
Secretary to follow in doing so. Does the equal protection or due
process analysis in fact require that there be clear standards to guide
the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion so that votes in
different parts of the state are not treated differently? (This may bear
on which votes get to stay in the certified totals now.)
Second, the statute is also arguably defective because of Statutory
Infelicity #2, where the statute provides for manual recounts, but
makes no adjustment in the deadlines for submitting vote tallies, thus
making it harder for manual recounts in large counties to be carried
182After the election, there were clearly groups that felt that the election had been

unfairly decided. The protests at George W. Bush's inauguration, the lingering
suspicion in the black community that its votes hadn't been counted and the ongoing
anger of at least some Democrats toward the new administration show it. One more
humorous sign of the discontent was the "Re-elect Gore in 2004" bumper stickers.
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out on time when smaller counties might be able to accomplish the
task. That would invite the equal protection challenge that votes in
smaller counties would receive more careful attention and more
checks than votes in larger counties. (This may lead to reconsidering
whether Miami-Dade voters were discriminated against because they
were in a large county that could not finish the recount back in the
protest phase, long before December 12.)
Third, it is arguably defective because of Statutory Infelicity #3,
where the statute makes no provision for statewide challenges in
statewide races, even though it is only through statewide challenges
that one can build in mechanisms for ensuring that the same
standards are used for recounting in an election that occurs in all
counties. (This raises questions about whether Volusia and Broward
Counties should be included in the certified vote totals if there was no
more counting to be done after December 12.)
Fourth, it is arguably defective because of Statutory Infelicity #4,
where the statute makes no provision for treating federal elections
and their special deadlines any differently from state elections which
have different time constraints. There are no expedited procedures
under the Florida statute that would allow election contests to be fairly
resolved under the federal deadlines, making virtually any remedy the
statute provides likely to be unusable for the election of presidential
electors in particular. And that further leads to a legitimate concern
that voters have more guarantees of accuracy in vote-counting when it
comes to any election other than the one for presidential electors.
Does the equal protection logic stop at presidential electors, or does
the provision of more protections for the vote-counting in one sort of
election than in another raise new equal protection problems? Could
someone argue an equal protection (or perhaps a due process)
violation because her vote for presidential electors received fewer
guarantees that it would be equally counted than, say, her vote for
Florida's national senators? (This raises broader questions about
whether there has been a due process denial because all of the
remedies were speeded up and then ultimately abandoned in the
presidential race.)
Fifth, the Florida statute is probably most explicitly defective in
the view of Supreme Court's per curiam opinion because of Statutory
Infelicity #5, where the statute gives state judges broad leeway to
investigate complaints and set things right, without providing any
standards for what counts as a legal vote or what counts as a
constitutionally acceptable procedure for ensuring that all votes are
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given equal protection in the tabulation processes. There is, for
example, no rule about hanging chads or specifying who is charged
with carrying out recounts, both of which under Bush v. Gore now
seem constitutionally required. (The Court focused particularly on
the absence of consistent recount standards. But there were some
recounts certified into the vote totals that were not conducted
pursuant to any such standards.' 8 )
The Florida statute is potentially constitutionally defective in
multiple areas and, as we have seen, each of these statutory infelicities
played a substantial role in the recount battles of Election 2000 long
before the December 12 deadline. And yet, the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Goreis supposed to be retroactive in its application
so that it applies with full force to Election 2000. The United States
has a national result in this presidential election that depended
crucially on a legal determination of Florida's vote totals. So then we
are left with a troubling question: What was the constitutionally valid
Florida election law under which Florida's presidential electors were
selected in 2000? From the chaotic ending of the recounts on
December 12, it appears that we know neither what the right numbers
are in Florida's vote totals nor what the law is under which we should
determine what they are.
The problem is multiplied when one looks across the United
States. Given that the "intent of the voter" standard was found in the
Florida context to provide insufficient guarantees of fairness in the
vote counting, does this mean that all of the states that used an intent
of the voter standard in their vote tallies are now in constitutional
trouble? Should there have been adjustments to the vote totals of
other states, in order for the American election to be decided
according to the constitutional standards spelled out by the per
curiam decision in Bush v. Gore in its retroactive application to
Election 2000? Or does Bush v. Gore apply only to the case of Florida,
leaving the other states' laws untouched even though they might have
had the same constitutional troubles in the same election? And what
sort of equal protection is it that applies federal constitutional
standards in one state only? In general, the usual understandings of
Article III find no constitutional problems with resolving some
concrete disputes without resolving all of the others that are logically
Even on the narrow reading of what the Court required-that equal protection
standards only applied to court-ordered recounts-the Broward County recounts that
were certified were done exactly according to a Florida Supreme Court judgment
telling them to continue counting.
1
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connected. But a national election raises special questions because
the results of all of the states have to be added together to produce a
single result, and having some states count votes one way and other
states count votes another way raises more complex issues about what
the relevant unit of "the case" is.
The confusion over what law decided Election 2000 raises more
questions: Is George W. Bush a president who came into office by
operation of the law-or uithout benefit of law? Or is the only
relevant law under which he became president the single baremajority decision of the U.S. Supreme Court itself announcing that
the election was over in the moment when the decision was made,
giving force to a status quo that may or may not have been achieved
according to the standards thatjustified stopping the clock?
Americans cannot look too closely at the law that decided the
2000 presidential election, because it isn't there. And that is perhaps
the most damning commentary on the rule of law for Election 2000 in
America.
In the end, the Knights Who Say Either "NI!" or
"Neeeow.. . wum... ping!" depending on how many of them decide

to speak in chorus, thought it was more important to settle the
election directly than to settle the law.
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